1994
DOI: 10.1177/1043463194006001006
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Rational Choice in Collective Protests

Abstract: A rational choice (RC) formulation of value-expectancy theory of participation in collective protests is described and applied to East German popular protests against the Communist regime in 1989. The heart of the RC model is a production function for collective good attainment, an assurance process that overcomes free rider tendencies and strategic interaction based on expectations.

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Cited by 150 publications
(72 citation statements)
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“…Political theorists rationalizing why people protest offer explanations based on the importance of peer pressure within smaller political groups (McCarthy and Zald 1977;Uhlaner 1989;Oberschall 1994), on people's (unrealistic) perception that that they can be politically influential (Opp 1989), and on bandwagon effects (Kuran 1989). However, these results leave the question of why protests would matter as instruments for political change unanswered.…”
Section: More Specifically We Investigate the Impact Of The Tea Partmentioning
confidence: 51%
“…Political theorists rationalizing why people protest offer explanations based on the importance of peer pressure within smaller political groups (McCarthy and Zald 1977;Uhlaner 1989;Oberschall 1994), on people's (unrealistic) perception that that they can be politically influential (Opp 1989), and on bandwagon effects (Kuran 1989). However, these results leave the question of why protests would matter as instruments for political change unanswered.…”
Section: More Specifically We Investigate the Impact Of The Tea Partmentioning
confidence: 51%
“…Finalmente, la contención política que estudiamos es producto de los esfuerzos compartidos de un grupo de individuos por alcanzar un bien público, (Tilly y Tarrow, 2006); por lo tanto cabe atender a los principales dilemas en su producción: la cooperación y la coordinación (Olson, 1965;Moore, 1995;Hardin, 1991;Oberschall, 1994;Hardin, 1995;1991;1971). El primer problema consiste en resolver si un grupo de individuos, al identificar la posibilidad de conseguir un bien público (o evitar un mal colectivo), estaría dispuesto a cooperar para alcanzarlo (o evitarlo); el segundo problema se refiere a la definición de los medios, las estrategias y tácticas que deben coordinar esos individuos, ya dispuestos a cooperar (Hardin, 1991).…”
Section: María Rosa Herrera Gutiérrezunclassified
“…Cuando menos, el contar con un mayor volumen de targets de movilización y la cercanía de éstos, suponen rasgos que facilitarían la decisión de dramatizar o no la contienda política (Oberschall, 1994;Navarro, 2008, Navarro y Clarck, 2009). …”
Section: Extensión E Intensidad De La Protesta: Argentina 1998-2005unclassified
“…Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that people do not participate in collective actions in isolation, but together with friends and neighbors (see McAdam 1986;Gould 1991;Opp and Gern 1993). Individuals decide to participate, if they are assured of the participation of their friends (Chong 1991;Oberschall 1973Oberschall , 1994. Chong (1991) and Oberschall (1994) described this as an assurance process.…”
Section: Structural Embeddedness Of Actionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Individuals decide to participate, if they are assured of the participation of their friends (Chong 1991;Oberschall 1973Oberschall , 1994. Chong (1991) and Oberschall (1994) described this as an assurance process. In the assurance process, behavioral confirmation has a two-fold effect.…”
Section: Structural Embeddedness Of Actionsmentioning
confidence: 99%