RATES, RIGHTS, AND REGIONAL PLANNING IN THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA¹

Abstract

The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California has for more than 70 years shaped the development of an immense urban region. The district's current strategic planning process therefore could have substantial effects on regional water planning and management. The rate restructuring phase of the planning process has produced a multiple component, cost of service based framework. This paper describes that framework as well as some criticisms that have been directed toward it. The rate restructuring was shaped, and for a while stalled, by old disputes among member agencies over rights to water supplied by Metropolitan. That controversy has diverted attention from the resource management implications of the rate structure. This paper presents an alternative future focused approach to regional integrated water resource planning for Southern California based on projections of current trends and anticipation of future events. This discussion raises the question of how regional integrated water resources planning of this sort may proceed, and what role Metropolitan will play in that process.

Preventing the repetition: Or, what Los Angeles' experience in water management can teach Atlanta about urban water disputes

“…Managerial and technological innovation alone will not succeed in implementing them. They require determination, savvy leadership, willingness to engage in interjurisdictional cooperation, and public awareness [ Beecher , 1995; Atwater and Blomquist , 2002]. Until recently, these factors were lacking in the water politics of southern California and, arguably, are still in short supply in the southeast [ Beecher , 1995; Hundley , 2001; Carle , 2003].…”

Conflict and Cooperation within an Organization: A Case Study of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California

“…30 Los Angles kept pushing, and sales revenue exceeded taxes by 1973; see Figure 3.8. Unfortunately, this change created a different problem: Since voting power remained a function of assessed land values, water buyers were paying a larger share of MET's expenses without gaining more control over how that revenue was spent, i.e., taxation without representation (SDCWA, 2001;Atwater and Blomquist, 2002). 31 Today, MET receives about 80 percent of its operating revenue from water sales; the rest comesin equal shares-from taxes and capacity charges (MET, 2004a).…”

“…What did MET do? In 1999, MET announced it would "act as a regional provider with contracting and shareholding characteristics," i.e., to do what it has always done (Atwater andBlomquist, 2002, p. 1197). 37…”

“…According toAtwater and Blomquist (2002), member agencies were not happy that MET included local supplies in its 1996 Integrated Water Resources Plan for the region 8. The LAA gives LADWP considerable leverage.…”

“…The Water Surplus and Drought Management plan of April 1999, for example, does not specify the details of allocation under drought(Atwater and Blomquist, 2002).…”