Rapid Transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 in Detention Facility, Louisiana, USA, May–June, 2020

Abstract

C orrectional and detention facilities face unique challenges for controlling severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the virus that causes coronavirus disease (COVID-19). These challenges include an inability for incarcerated or detained persons to socially distance and an ongoing risk for virus introduction caused by staff movement outside and within the facilities (1,2). These inherent difficulties underpin increased rates of SARS-CoV-2 infections and deaths among incarcerated and detained persons compared with the general population; 146,472 cases and 1,122 deaths in this population were reported in the United States as of October 20, 2020 (3,4). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) released interim guidance for management of COVID-19 in correctional and detention facilities; however, some facilities reported limitations to fully implementing the guidance (5-7). In addition, the potential for asymptomatic and presymptomatic transmission limits the effectiveness of symptom screening to identify cases and halt transmission (8-10). In other congregate settings, serial testing and physically separating persons based on their SARS-CoV-2 test results have been used to interrupt transmission (11,12). We investigated a COVID-19 outbreak in a detention center in Louisiana, USA (facility X) and used a serial testing strategy to identify infections and interrupt transmission in affected dormitories. All residents of affected dormitories underwent SARS-CoV-2 testing to assess the extent of transmission within the dormitory, to cohort detained persons based on their test result to prevent transmission, and to evaluate the utility of serial testing in this setting. We report the findings of this investigation; initial results were previously reported (13).

Transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) from pre and asymptomatic infected individuals: a systematic review

“…Of the 18 included studies, 7 were done in the USA [19][20][21][22][23][24][25], 7 in Europe [26][27][28], of which 4 were in UK [29][30][31][32], two in Canada [33,34], one in Japan (cruise ship) [35] and one in Australia (flight) [36]. Most studies were completed in 2020, with 11 in the first half of the year [19,22,25,27,28,30,31,[33][34][35][36], and four in the second half [23,24,26,29]; two studies were done between December and January 2021 [20,21].…”

“…Three studies were based in schools with or without associated J o u r n a l P r e -p r o o f households [20,21,29]. Other settings included an emergency childcare center (children and staff) [34], a detention center [25], passengers on a flight [36], passengers disembarking a cruise ship [35], staff in an army barracks [31], a military facility [27], healthcare workers in a hospital [33], households [22] and a university campus [23]. Studies included varying designs, including cross-sectional, repeat surveys, or symptom-responsive screening designs; and studies addressed varying research questions.…”

“…Sixteen studies reported carrying GS for phylogenetic assessment to assess possible alternative sources of infection [19][20][21][22][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36].…”

A multi-center phase II randomized clinical trial of losartan on symptomatic outpatients with COVID-19

“…We hypothesized that if losartan were to reduce hospitalization, this would be achieved through the reduction of angiotensin II induced lung injury. We captured dyspnea using self-reported a 5-question dyspnea symptom inventory (PROMIS) [ 29 , 30 ] and functional status using a validated instrument often utilized to assess quality of life in dyspneic patients (SF-12) [31] . We measured maximum daily temperature as a proxy of systemic inflammation.…”

Outbreaks of Covid-19 Variants in Prisons: A Mathematical Modeling Analysis of Vaccination and Re-Opening Policies

“…Sensitivity analyses showed a substantial increase in expected infections and hospitalizations when the likelihood of repeated importation of infections is high (Figure 4), emphasizing the importance of preventing infections from being introduced. While of limited utility for controlling outbreaks once an infection is introduced (Appendix Figure S23), staff vaccination is crucial for choking one of the main avenues of introduction (6,33). Maintaining ongoing screening and testing of residents, staff, and visitors may also prevent introductions and limit the spread of prison outbreaks.…”