Rapid cognitive flexibility of rhesus macaques performing psychophysical task-switching

Avdagic, Ema; Jensen, Greg; Terrace, H. S.

doi:10.1007/s10071-013-0693-0

Cited by 31 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 52 publications

(75 reference statements)

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“…Unfortunately, research on the task-switching abilities of animals is equivocal with respect to this assumption: none of the several independent studies on rhesus macaques could convincingly demonstrate switch costs in the monkeys' performance (Avdagic et al, 2014;Stoet & Snyder, 2003a, 2003b, 2008, 2009. Similarly, the present paper and previous research using pigeons (Castro & Wasserman, 2016;Meier et al, 2013) found no evidence that associative processes may lead to switch costs in response to incongruent stimuli -pigeons did not show any evidence of reduced performance when the tasks switched on trials with incongruent stimuli.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Task-switching in pigeons: Associative learning or executive control?

Meier¹,

Lea²,

McLaren³

2016

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cogniti

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Human performance in task-switching paradigms is seen as a hallmark of executive-control processes: switching between tasks induces switch costs (such that performance when changing from Task A to Task B is worse than on trials where the task repeats), which is generally attributed to executive control suppressing one task-set and activating the other. However, even in cases where task-sets are not employed, as well as in computational modeling of task switching, switch costs can still be found. This observation has led to the hypothesis that associative-learning processes might be responsible for all or part of the switch costs in task-switching paradigms. To test which cognitive processes contribute to the presence of task-switch costs, pigeons performed two different tasks on the same set of stimuli in rapid alternation. The pigeons showed no sign of switch costs, even though performance on Trial N was influenced by Trial N - 1, showing that they were sensitive to sequential effects. Using Pearce's (1987) model for stimulus generalization, we conclude that they learned the task associatively-in particular, a form of Pavlovian-conditioned approach was involved-and that this was responsible for the lack of any detectable switch costs. Pearce's model also allows us to make interferences about the common occurrence of switch costs in the absence of task-sets in human participants and in computational models, in that they are likely due to instrumental learning and the establishment of an equivalence between cues signaling the same task.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Task-switching in pigeons: Associative learning or executive control?

Meier¹,

Lea²,

McLaren³

2016

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cogniti

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“…Indeed, pigeons showed no task-switching costs, even when the target stimuli were bivalent (Meier et al, 2013;Meier et al, 2016). Interestingly, monkeys do not show switch costs either, despite evidence that they use and represent task rules (Stoet & Snyder, 2003, 2004Avdagic, Jensen, Altschul & Terrace, 2013). The latter suggests that eliminating switch costs may be possible without having to rely on CTR associations.…”

Section: Associative Learning Account Of Task-switching Costsmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…This observation provides an alternative explanation for task-switching results in monkeys. Monkeys can also perform task-switching without showing any significant task-switching costs (Stoet & Snyder, 2003, 2004Avdagic et al, 2013). However, unlike pigeons which may not be able to apply task rules (Meier et al, 2013;Meier et al, 2016; but see Soto & Wasserman, 2010;Castro & Wasserman, 2016) various studies demonstrated that monkeys do have executive control abilities and can apply rule-based strategies (Stoet & Snyder, 2004;Avdagic et al, 2013).…”

Section: Task-switching In Pigeons and Monkeysmentioning

confidence: 99%

Task-switching costs disappear if non-Chinese participants respond to Chinese characters.

Li¹,

Li²,

Liu³

et al. 2019

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni

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In experiments with univalent target stimuli task-switching costs can be eliminated if participants are unaware of the task rules and apply cue-target-response associations. However, in experiments with bivalent target stimuli participants show task-switching costs. Participants may exhibit switch costs even when no task rules are provided in the instructions because they can infer the task rules. We tested this prediction by controlling the meaningfulness of cues and targets and therefore the ability to apply the task rules in two groups of participants. We compared the performance of Chinese and non-Chinese participants, who responded to Chinese numerals in an odd/even and high/low number task. In Experiment 1, Chinese participants, who knew Chinese characters and understood the task rules, showed task-switching costs. Non-Chinese participants on the other hand, who did not know Chinese characters, exhibited no switch costs. They applied a "target-first" strategy which means that they processed the target stimulus before the cue. In Experiment 2, we confirmed the absence of task-switching costs in Chinese participants using traditional Chinese numerals as target stimuli. Further, to determine how the target-first strategy affects switch costs, we manipulated the sequence of cue and target presentations. We conclude that task-switching costs can be eliminated more easily than previously thought, even for bivalent stimuli. The occurrence of task-switching costs depends on the approach used by participants and this may answer the puzzling question why humans typically do show task-switching costs whereas pigeons and monkeys do not.

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“…Overall, these results resemble patterns of learning observed in classical SimChains presenting fixed arbitrary photographs (Terrace, 2005;Jensen et al, 2013a), and in SimChains for which the list order was determined by some psychophysical dimension (Avdagic et al, 2014). This demonstrates both that subjects were able to classify the categorical stimuli, and that the serial learning of categories was consistent with other previously reported forms of serial learning.…”

Section: Monkeyssupporting

confidence: 86%

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Supplemental Information 1: Raw Data &Amp; Analysis Script

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Humans are highly adept at categorizing visual stimuli, but studies of human categorization are typically validated by verbal reports. This makes it difficult to perform comparative studies of categorization using non-human animals. Interpretation of comparative studies is further complicated by the possibility that animal performance may merely reflect reinforcement learning, whereby discrete features act as discriminative cues for categorization. To assess and compare how humans and monkeys classified visual stimuli, we trained 7 rhesus macaques and 41 human volunteers to respond, in a specific order, to four simultaneously presented stimuli at a time, each belonging to a different perceptual category. These exemplars were drawn at random from large banks of images, such that the stimuli presented changed on every trial. Subjects nevertheless identified and ordered these changing stimuli correctly. Three monkeys learned to order naturalistic photographs; four others, close-up sections of paintings with distinctive styles. Humans learned to order both types of stimuli. All subjects classified stimuli at levels substantially greater than that predicted by chance or by feature-driven learning alone, even when stimuli changed one every trial. However, humans more closely resembled monkeys when classifying the more abstract painting stimuli than the photographic stimuli. This points to a common classification strategy in both species, on which humans can rely on in the absence of linguistic labels for categories.

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Rapid cognitive flexibility of rhesus macaques performing psychophysical task-switching

Cited by 31 publications

References 52 publications

Task-switching in pigeons: Associative learning or executive control?

Task-switching in pigeons: Associative learning or executive control?

Task-switching costs disappear if non-Chinese participants respond to Chinese characters.

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