Range dependent expected utility theory based model for NIMBY conflicts in China: An evolutionary game analysis

Abstract

In recent years, NIMBY(Not In My Backyard) conflicts gradually become hot and difficult in the international community governance, people have realized that the government and people on both sides of the emotional factors have great influences on the results of the conflicts, especially to study the effects of emotion on the evolution of conflicts in China, this article from the following several aspects. First of all, a game model under the influences of emotion is constructed by using Range Dependent Expected Utility(RDEU) theory and emotional function. Secondly, the Jacobian matrix is utilized to analyze the stability of the equilibrium point for the model constructed above. Next, numerical simulation is used to analyze the evolution trend of discrete emotions. The evolutionary results show that when one party holds an optimistic mood, equilibrium evolves to a relatively optimal state; while when one party holds a pessimistic mood, the more pessimistic the party is, the more likely it is to cause NIMBY conflicts. Compared with the people’s sentiments, the government’s moods have a greater impact on the evolutionary consequences. Finally, depending on the conclusions of the evolutionary analysis, some suggestions on the governance of NIMBY conflicts are put forward.

A study of steady-state strategies for collaborative quality improvement in new retail service supply chains considering emotional factors

“…Liu et al [47] used RDEU game to analyze the equilibrium strategies of emitting countries and stakeholder countries in different cases, and found that the most expected emotional state of the country that prevents the emitting country from discharging nuclear wastewater is to maintain pessimism for stakeholder countries. Zhao et al [48] constructed a neighborhood conflict game model under the influences of emotions by using RDEU theory and emotion function, and found that the government's emotions have a greater effect on the evolutionary consequences compared with the people's emotions. Liu et al [49] combined the iron ore trade conflict between Chinese steel companies and Australian iron ore mining companies with the asymmetric hawk-dove game model to analyze the iron ore trade conflict between Chinese steel companies and Australian iron ore mining companies, and found that, when the emotional factors and asymmetric factors are equal, the probability of the Australian companies' adopting the extreme antagonistic tactics is higher compared with that of the Chinese companies.…”