2009
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03356-8_7
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Randomizable Proofs and Delegatable Anonymous Credentials

Abstract: We construct an efficient delegatable anonymous credentials system. Users can anonymously and unlinkably obtain credentials from any authority, delegate their credentials to other users, and prove possession of a credential L levels away from a given authority. The size of the proof (and time to compute it) is O(Lk), where k is the security parameter. The only other construction of delegatable anonymous credentials (Chase and Lysyanskaya, Crypto 2006) relies on general non-interactive proofs for NP-complete la… Show more

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Cited by 180 publications
(155 citation statements)
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“…As shown in [7], GS proofs have composable randomizability, where randomizability holds even if we switch to the simulation setting.…”
Section: Groth-sahai (Gs) Proofsmentioning
confidence: 97%
See 3 more Smart Citations
“…As shown in [7], GS proofs have composable randomizability, where randomizability holds even if we switch to the simulation setting.…”
Section: Groth-sahai (Gs) Proofsmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…As formalized by [7], GS proofs can be rerandomized by rerandomizing the associated GS commitments and updating the proofs accordingly so that we obtain fresh proofs that are unlinkable to the original ones. Rerandomizing a proof requires knowledge of neither the witness nor the associated randomness used in the original GS commitments.…”
Section: Groth-sahai (Gs) Proofsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…In addition, GS proofs are known to be malleable which, although useful in certain applications [3,11], is undesirable when NIZK proofs serve as building blocks for nonmalleable protocols. To construct chosen-ciphertext-secure encryption schemes [36], for example, the Naor-Yung/Sahai [32,37] paradigm requires NIZK proofs satisfying a property called simulation-soundness [37]: informally, this property captures the inability of the adversary to prove false statements, even after having observed simulated proofs for possibly false statements of its choice.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%