Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems

Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila; Sönmez, Tayfun

doi:10.2307/2998580

Cited by 514 publications

(562 citation statements)

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“…Without priorities, DA is the same as a random serial dictatorship (RSD), that is, a serial dictatorship with applicants ordered by lottery number (see, e.g., Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez 1998, Svensson 1999, Pathak and Sethuraman 2010. 4 Theorem 1 therefore implies the following corollary, which gives the RSD propensity score:…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation

Abdulkadiroğlu¹,

Angrist²,

Narita³

et al. 2015

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A growing number of school districts use centralized assignment mechanisms to allocate school seats in a manner that reflects student preferences and school priorities. Many of these assignment schemes use lotteries to ration seats when schools are oversubscribed. The resulting random assignment opens the door to credible quasi-experimental research designs for the evaluation of school effectiveness. Yet the question of how best to separate the lottery-generated variation integral to such designs from non-random preferences and priorities remains open. This paper develops easily-implemented empirical strategies that fully exploit the random assignment embedded in the widely-used deferred acceptance mechanism and its variants. We use these methods to evaluate charter schools in Denver, one of a growing number of districts that integrate charter and traditional public schools in a unified assignment system. The resulting estimates show large achievement gains from charter school attendance. Our approach expands the scope for impact evaluation by maximizing the number of students and schools that can be studied using random assignment. We also show how to use DA to identify causal effects in models with multiple school sectors.

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confidence: 99%

Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation

Abdulkadiroğlu¹,

Angrist²,

Narita³

et al. 2015

Self Cite

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“…Random serial dictatorship is a classic mechanism for one-sided domains that obtains a Pareto-optimal allocation by iterative arrival of agents in a uniform random order [1,6]. In two-sided instances, Ma [25] proposed the random-order mechanism, where agents arrive in uniform random order and blocking pairs are resolved in a best-response manner.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Maintaining Near-Popular Matchings

Bhattacharya

Hoefer

Huang

et al. 2015

Automata, Languages, and Programming

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We study dynamic matching problems in graphs among agents with preferences. Agents and/or edges of the graph arrive and depart iteratively over time. The goal is to maintain matchings that are favorable to the agent population and stable over time. More formally, we strive to keep nearpopular matchings with a small unpopularity factor by making only a small amortized number of changes to the matching per round. Our main result is an algorithm to maintain matchings with unpopularity factor (∆ + k) by making an amortized number of O(∆ + ∆ 2 /k) changes per round, for any k > 0. Here ∆ denotes the maximum degree of any agent in any round. We complement this result by a variety of lower bounds indicating that matchings with smaller factor do not exist or cannot be maintained using our algorithm.As a byproduct, we obtain several additional results of independent interest. First, our algorithm implies existence of matchings with small unpopularity factors in graphs with bounded degree. Second, given any matching M and any value α ≥ 1, we provide an efficient algorithm to compute a matching M with unpopularity factor α over M if it exists. Finally, our results show the absence of voting paths in two-sided instances, even if we restrict to sequences of matchings with larger unpopularity factors (below ∆).

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“…1 RSD retains the important properties of ex post efficiency and strategyproofness and is well-established in the context of random assignment [see e.g., 12,1,5,8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship

Aziz

Brandt

Brill

2013

Web and Internet Economics

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In social choice settings with linear preferences, random dictatorship is known to be the only social decision scheme satisfying strategyproofness and ex post efficiency. When also allowing indifferences, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a well-known generalization of random dictatorship that retains both properties. RSD has been particularly successful in the special domain of random assignment where indifferences are unavoidable. While executing RSD is obviously feasible, we show that computing the resulting probabilities is #P-complete and thus intractable, both in the context of voting and assignment.

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Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems

Cited by 514 publications

References 6 publications

Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation

Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation

Maintaining Near-Popular Matchings

The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship

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