Rags and Riches

Krishna, Kala; Tan,

doi:10.3998/mpub.15459

Cited by 44 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…There is evidence that this may have been the case in Hong Kong but less so in other major exporters such as China and India, where incumbents had preferences in the allocation of quotas. Thus, quota licence prices may underestimate the value of the quota for exporters (Krishna and Tan, 1998).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Estimating Trade Restrictiveness Indices

Kee

Nicita

Olarreaga

2008

The Economic Journal

545

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Studies of the impact of trade restrictiveness on growth, poverty or unemployment are frequent in the academic literature. Few authors, however, provide a precise definition of what they mean by trade restrictiveness. When they do, the definition is unlikely to have tight links with trade theory. The objective of this article is to fill this gap by providing for 78 developing and developed countries clearly defined indicators of trade restrictiveness that are well grounded in trade theory. Results suggest that poor countries tend to have more restrictive trade policies but they also face higher trade barriers on their exports.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…20 20 For a review of the early literature see Krishna and Tan (1998). Early studies focused exclusively on Hong Kong because it was the only country that in the 1980s had a public and open market for quota licences. …”

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confidence: 99%

Estimating Trade Restrictiveness Indices

Kee

Nicita

Olarreaga

2008

The Economic Journal

545

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“…Moschini, 1991;Skully, 1999;Boughner et al, 2000) and in other sectors (e.g. Bark and de Melo, 1987, 1988, 1989Krishna and Tan, 1998). However, little formal research has been undertaken as to the potential effects of tariff quotas on economic inefficiency through rent-seeking activities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Like Krishna (1993), McCorriston and Sheldon (1994), McCorriston (1996), and Krishna and Tan (1998), we focus on the implementation of import quotas in terms of the rules governing allocation and the effects on rent appropriation and rent sharing. However, we go one step further and analyze the economics of rent-seeking waste.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rent Seeking with Politically Contestable Rights to Tariff-rate Import Quotas**

Hranaiova¹,

Gorter²

2005

Rev International Economics

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This paper analyzes rent seeking for agricultural import quotas and the associated waste of resources when politically contestable licenses are allocated to either or both importers and exporters. In a two‐stage simultaneous contest where firms seek rent for licenses and then bargain over the import/export price, it is shown that (1) rents are not dissipated completely because of uncertainty in allocation of “rights,” (2) the dissipation ratio increases if the country with a more competitive contest increases the probability of establishing licenses, (3) rent seeking may cause the market structure to change, (4) less rent is dissipated in the case of pre‐existing market power, and (5) allocation of multiple licenses decreases rent‐seeking outlays.

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“…Our article aims to fill the gap in the literature on non-auction methods by developing a formal model of licenses-on-demand and assessing the effects on economic efficiency of trade liberalization, license fees, heterogeneity of cost structures, non-use penalties, license limits per firm, and entry. Like Krishna and Tan (1998) and McCorriston and Sheldon (1994), we focus on the implementation of import quotas in terms of how the rules governing allocation affect the distribution of rents and economic efficiency.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Economics of Administering Import Quotas with Licenses‐on‐Demand in Agriculture

Hranaiova¹,

Gorter

Falk

2006

American J Agri Economics

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A Nash equilibrium is determined for licenses-on-demand import quotas where licenses are allocated on a prorated basis. Inefficiency is incurred because licenses are allocated to high-cost firms. The ability to overbid exacerbates the inefficiency due to proportionate reductions in licenses. Quota expansion causes high-cost firms to decrease their bids but reduces inefficiency. The entry of a new firm causes all incumbent firms to increase bids or bid the quota. Not penalizing firms for the non-use of licenses increases inefficiency. The inefficiency impacts of tariff reductions, license fees, limits per firm, and imperfect information are also addressed. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

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Rags and Riches

Cited by 44 publications

References 0 publications

Estimating Trade Restrictiveness Indices

Estimating Trade Restrictiveness Indices

Rent Seeking with Politically Contestable Rights to Tariff-rate Import Quotas**

The Economics of Administering Import Quotas with Licenses‐on‐Demand in Agriculture

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