Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany

Abstract

How far can the media protect or undermine democratic institutions in unconsolidated democracies, and how persuasive can they be in ensuring public support for dictator's policies? We study this question in the context of Germany between 1929 and 1939. Using geographical and temporal variation in radio availability, we show that radio had a significant negative effect on the Nazi electoral support between 1929 and 1932, when political news were slanted against Nazi party. This effect was reversed in just 5 weeks following Hitler's appointment as chancellor and the transfer of control of the radio to the Nazis. Pro-Nazi radio propaganda caused higher vote for the Nazis in March 1933 election. After full consolidation of power, radio propaganda helped the Nazis to enroll new party members and encouraged denunciations of Jews and other open expressions of anti-Semitism. The effect of Nazi propaganda was not uniform. Depending on listeners' priors about the message, propaganda could be very effective or could backfire. Nazi radio was most effective in places where anti-Semitism was historically high and had a negative effect on the support for anti-Semitic policies in places with historically low anti-Semitism.

When Autocrats Threaten Citizens with Violence: Evidence from China

“…For instance, Joseph Goebbels, architect of Nazi Germany's propaganda, instructed the state media to report information that damaged the government, ‘otherwise the facts might expose falsehoods’ (Doob 1950). This strategy appears common in Vladimir Putin's Russia (Adena et al 2015; Enikolopov, Petrova and Zhuravskaya 2011; Rozenas and Stukal 2018).…”

“…It advances three literatures. First, scholars have recently learned much about autocratic propaganda: why it is employed (Edmond 2013; Gehlbach and Sonin 2014; Huang 2015), when (Egorov, Guriev and Sonin 2009; Qin, Strömberg and Wu 2018; Rozenas and Stukal 2018), its effects (Adena et al 2015; DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Enikolopov, Petrova and Zhuravskaya 2011), and the cognitive mechanisms used to achieve those effects (Little 2017). Broadly, this literature conceptualizes propaganda as designed to persuade citizens: either of the regime's merits or its repressive capacity (Gehlbach, Svolik and Sonin 2016, 578).…”

Dehumanization: trends, insights, and challenges

“…One example [91] points to an analysis of radio broadcasts by Hutu station RLTM in Rwanda during the infamous genocide of the Tutsis [92], often invoked as a paradigmatic case of dehumanizing propaganda leading to mass violence. Interestingly, however, the analysis finds that fewer than 10% of Rwandans in 1994 actually owned radio transmitters; that temporal variations in the frequency of violence did not match the broadcast range of radio; and that much violence occurred prior to the spike in dehumanizing broadcasts (see also [93]). Instead, this work points to the role of authority, peer pressure, and ingroup norms, noting that dehumanization may be more important in sustaining ongoing killing and/or activating existing animosity (versus creating it [91]).…”

Social Media and Xenophobia: Evidence from Russia

“…This stark heterogeneity is consistent with results on traditional media, which suggest that the impact of media on active manifestation of xenophobic attitudes depends on predispositions of the population. For example, Adena et al (2015) demonstrate that radio propaganda by the Nazis in the 1930s was effective only in areas with historically high level of antisemitism, while Yanagizawa-Drott (2014), finds that social interactions allow the effect of traditional media (radio) on conflict to propagate. We further show that the effect of social media is stronger for crimes committed by multiple perpetrators (as opposed to those committed by single persons), consistent with social media likely playing a coordinating role.…”