2006
DOI: 10.1162/jeea.2006.4.2-3.446
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Racism, Xenophobia, and Redistribution

Abstract: We model political competition as a contest between parties that represent constituents, and which announce policies in a two-dimensional policy space; the first dimension concerns the degree of redistribution, and the second, the race or immigration issue. Given the distribution of voter preferences on this space, a political equilibrium is determined. We study the effect that racist or anti-immigrant preferences in the polity have on equilibrium values of the redistributive policy. For the United States, the… Show more

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Cited by 28 publications
(22 citation statements)
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“…We have already commented several times on the role of these compositional externalities on preferences. We close this survey by taking note of an interesting research programme developed by John Roemer and colleagues that seeks to explicitly build these considerations into formal political economy models (Roemer and Van Der Straeten, 2005, 2006; Lee and Roemer, 2006; Woojin Lee et al. , 2006; Roemer et al.…”
Section: Welfare and Political Economymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We have already commented several times on the role of these compositional externalities on preferences. We close this survey by taking note of an interesting research programme developed by John Roemer and colleagues that seeks to explicitly build these considerations into formal political economy models (Roemer and Van Der Straeten, 2005, 2006; Lee and Roemer, 2006; Woojin Lee et al. , 2006; Roemer et al.…”
Section: Welfare and Political Economymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In a recent book, Roemer et al (2007) study the U.S., but also three European countries: Denmark (see also Roemer and van der Straeten 2006), France, and the United Kingdom. We choose not to review these studies here: for a short review of their main results, see Lee et al (2006), and for a non-technical review (in French) summing up their results for France, see Roemer et al (2005). We rather choose to present here two more recent contributions for Europe, using data from the European Social Survey and from the German Socio-Economic Panel (section 3.1.2).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The interaction is also difficult to square with an even more sophisticated preference argument that allows for a varying gap between the preferences of the median voter and the median politician that might emerge from a two‐dimensional policy space, as in Lee, Roemer, and Straeten (). If anything, under such a model, we would expect the gap between the median voter and politician to be smallest in the most xenophobic municipalities since local voters there care most intensely about the immigration dimension.…”
Section: Why Do Immigrants Fare Worse Under Direct Democracy?mentioning
confidence: 99%