Racial Discrimination and Competition

Levine, Ross; Levkov, Alexey; Rubinstein, Yona

doi:10.3386/w14273

Cited by 48 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 62 publications

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“…They are linked to changes in entry rates (Black and Strahan 2002;Kerr and Nanda 2009), the firm size distribution (Cetorelli and Strahan 2006), the fragility of new entrants (Cetorelli 2009), and productivity/growth (Jayaratne and Strahan 1996). Recent work further associates these reforms with changes in crime rates (Garmaise and Moskowitz 2006), racial discrimination (Levine, Levkov, and Rubinstein 2008), and similar outcomes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Banking Deregulations, Financing Constraints, and Firm Entry Size

Kerr¹,

Nanda²

2010

Journal of the European Economic Association

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We examine the effect of U.S. branch banking deregulations on the entry size of new firms, using micro-data from the U.S. Census Bureau. We find that the average entry size for startups did not change following the deregulations. However, among firms that survived at least four years, a greater proportion of firms entered either at their maximum size or closer to the maximum size in the first year. The magnitude of these effects were small compared to the much larger changes in entry rates of small firms following the reforms. Our results highlight that this large-scale entry at the extensive margin can obscure the more subtle intensive margin effects of changes in financing constraints.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Banking Deregulations, Financing Constraints, and Firm Entry Size

Kerr¹,

Nanda²

2010

Journal of the European Economic Association

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“…In a developed-country setting,Black and Strahan (2001) andLevine et al (2010) also find that discrimination against female and minority-race employees fell in the U.S. after a branch deregulation resulted in higher competition.…”

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confidence: 89%

Sex and Credit: Is There a Gender Bias in Microfinance?

2011

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This paper examines the effects of group identity in the credit market. Exploiting the quasirandom assignment of first-time borrowers to loan officers of a large Albanian lender, we test for own-gender bias in the loan officer-borrower match. We find that borrowers pay on average 29 basis points higher interest rates when paired with a loan officer of the other sex.The results indicate the presence of a taste-based rather than a statistical bias, as borrowers' likelihood of going into arrears is independent of loan officer gender. Ending up with an opposite-sex loan officer also affects demand for credit, with borrowers being 11.5 percent less likely to return for a second loan. The bias is more pronounced when the social distance, as proxied by difference in age between the loan officer and the borrower, increases and when financial market competition declines. This is consistent with theories that predict a tastebased bias to be stronger when the psychological costs of being biased are lower and the discretion in setting interest rates is higher. Taken together, the findings suggest that owngender preferences can have substantial welfare effects. JEL Classification: G21, G32, J16.

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“…Several empirical studies support this view. Levine et al (2008), for example, find that deregulation, and thus more competition in financial markets, reduces racial discrimination. Cavaluzzo et al (2002) also find that competition reduces discrimination.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Women and Credit in Peru During the Guano Era. Was There Gender Discrimination in the Mortgage Credit Market of Peru?

Zegarra¹

2014

RHE / JILAEH

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This article analyses the role of women and gender discrimination in the mortgage credit market in Peru between 1860 and 1875. Relying on a large sample of notarised loans, the article shows that women participated in the credit market as lenders and borrowers. However, their participation was lower than that of men. In addition, women received smaller loans and paid higher interest rates than men. The evidence suggests that the lower participation of women as borrowers and their smaller loans were largely a consequence of the distribution of collateral. In addition, much of the difference in interest rates resulted from the differences in loan sizes. As women received smaller loans and there were probably fixed costs involved in granting a loan, making a loan to a woman implied a higher average cost.

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Racial Discrimination and Competition

Cited by 48 publications

References 62 publications

Banking Deregulations, Financing Constraints, and Firm Entry Size

Banking Deregulations, Financing Constraints, and Firm Entry Size

Sex and Credit: Is There a Gender Bias in Microfinance?

Women and Credit in Peru During the Guano Era. Was There Gender Discrimination in the Mortgage Credit Market of Peru?

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