1999
DOI: 10.1016/s0014-2921(97)00111-6
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R&D cooperation or competition?

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Cited by 73 publications
(36 citation statements)
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“…On the other side, detractors of interfirm cooperation argue that these collaborative activities may be anticompetitive because of the risks that the cooperation may lead to outcomes harmful to consumer welfare (Clarke 1983;Petit and Tolwinski 1999;Wright 1986). For example, Wright (1986) suggests that alliances among competitors may suffer from "overinclusiveness."…”
Section: Sivadas and Dwyer 2000)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the other side, detractors of interfirm cooperation argue that these collaborative activities may be anticompetitive because of the risks that the cooperation may lead to outcomes harmful to consumer welfare (Clarke 1983;Petit and Tolwinski 1999;Wright 1986). For example, Wright (1986) suggests that alliances among competitors may suffer from "overinclusiveness."…”
Section: Sivadas and Dwyer 2000)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It has been a long-standing indication in the literature, confirmed in a dynamic framework by Petit and Tolwinski (1999), that larger spillovers can prevent the monopolization of the industry by easing imitation. Using a richer analytical framework and considering all possible absolute and relative differences in firms' production costs, this paper shows that while intuitive, the above result is not universally true.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…Surveying this literature, De Bondt (1997) reports that while the amount of R&D done by each firm tends to decrease as spillovers increase (due to a free-riding effect), industry output and welfare increase as long as the level of spillovers is below some critical intermediate value (0.5 in the homogenous goods case of d' Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)). Petit and Tolwinski (1999) consider asymmetric firms in a dynamic, though deterministic, context. They show that when firms are symmetric, high spillovers are not desirable from the consumers' perspective as they lead to low R&D efforts and high prices.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…2 Norbäck (2001) analyzes the same issue but considers a single firm that produces a good whose demand is located in another country. The firm decides its technology, which can be implemented at home without cost or abroad with a transfer cost (since it must be adapted to 1 See, e. g. d 'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et al (1992) and Petit and Tolwinski (1998). local conditions).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%