Quitting and peer effects at work

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S ABSTRACTQuitting and Peer Effects at Work * While peer effects have been shown to affect worker's productivity when workers are paid a fixed wage, there is little evidence on their influence on quitting decisions. This paper presents results from an experiment in which participants receive a piece-rate wage to perform a real-effort task. After completing a compulsory work period, the participants have the option at any time to continue working or quit. To study peer effects, we randomly assign participants to work alone or have one other worker in the room with them. When a peer is present, we manipulate the environment by giving either vague or precise feedback on the co-worker's output, and also vary whether the two workers can communicate. We find that allowing individuals to work with a co-worker present does not increase worker's productivity. However, the presence of a peer in all working conditions causes workers to quit at more similar times. When, and only when, communication is allowed, workers are significantly more likely to (1) stay longer if their partner is still working, and (2) work longer the more productive they are. We conclude that when workers receive a piece-rate wage, critical peer effects occur only when workers can communicate with each other.JEL Classification: C91, D83, J63, J28, J81

Monetary and non-monetary incentives in real-effort tournaments

“…Several studies have considered outside options as additional features to the design of the tasks. For example, subjects have been provided with the option to leave the laboratory early (e.g., Dickinson, 1999;Rosaz, Slonim, and Villeval, 2016), browse newspapers or magazines (e.g., Charness, Masclet, and Villeval, 2014;Rey-Biel, Sheremeta, and Uler, 2017), surf the Internet (e.g., Kessler and Norton, 2016), watch preselected popular YouTube videos (e.g., Hayashi, Nakamura, and Gamage, 2013), press a paid timeout button (e.g., Mohnen, Pokorny, and Sliwka, 2008;Blumkin, Ruffle, and Ganun, 2012), or participate in an alternative activity (e.g., van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden, 2001). 6…”

Disincentives from Redistribution: Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy

“…In addition there are also several papers offering unpaid alternatives (e.g., Abeler et al 2011;Charness, Masclet, and Villeval 2014;Corgnet, Hernán-González, and Rassenti 2015;Kessler and Norton 2016) or the option to leave the lab (Dickinson 1999;Rosaz, Slonim, and Villeval 2016). We cannot use either of these alternatives as we need monetary opportunity cost in order to predict money-maximizing behavior.…”

Performance Feedback and Peer Effects

“…Conformity may also influence the extensive margin of effort provision. Rosaz et al (2016) designed an experiment where subjects have to decide when to quit. They manipulate whether subjects work alone or in the presence of a peer like in Falk and Ichino (2006), whether the subject is informed continuously on the evolution of the peer's performance or not, and whether communication is allowed or forbidden.…”