1989
DOI: 10.1353/hph.1989.0050
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Quine's 1946 Lectures on Hume

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1

Citation Types

0
3
0

Year Published

2006
2006
2020
2020

Publication Types

Select...
4
1

Relationship

0
5

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 5 publications
0
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…So great is the problem that in his 1946 lectures on Hume, W.V.O. Quine, arguably the most influential philosopher of the 20th century, noted that the “Humean predicament [the problem of induction] is the human predicament.” 10 This is the first hurdle we need to understand and overcome—the limitation of scientific knowledge. The classic example of the problem of induction relates to the discovery of black swans.…”
Section: The Problem Of Inductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…So great is the problem that in his 1946 lectures on Hume, W.V.O. Quine, arguably the most influential philosopher of the 20th century, noted that the “Humean predicament [the problem of induction] is the human predicament.” 10 This is the first hurdle we need to understand and overcome—the limitation of scientific knowledge. The classic example of the problem of induction relates to the discovery of black swans.…”
Section: The Problem Of Inductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…By contrast to Lewis, Quine had a solid grounding in Hume that went well beyond undergraduate perusal. He gave a lecture course on Hume at Harvard in the mid-1940s, whose content was of such interest that it was recently published (Quine 2003(Quine [1946), and has been the subject of several scholarly papers (Pakaluk 1989, Buickerood 2004. A noteworthy passage in it prefigures a sort of counterfactual theory of causation, even though Lewis's version pre-dates his association with Quine.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Fogelin makes much of the connection with Hume, arguing that a commitment to Humean skepticism about induction is fundamental to Quine's attempt to naturalize epistemology. Indeed, he argues that Quine's subtle understanding of Hume's own attempt to naturalize philosophy, as evidenced by "Quine's 1946 Lectures on Hume" (Pakaluk, 1989), was an important influence on Quine's project.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%