Questioning the Effect of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict

Bell, Mark S.; Miller, Nicholas L.

doi:10.1177/0022002713499718

Cited by 102 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…This conclusion, however, raises questions about how to reconcile this study's findings with those of a recent quantitative dyadic-level study (Bell and Miller, 2015). The current paper finds that nuclear proliferation decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict, while Bell and Miller (2015) find that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on dyadic conflict, but that nuclear asymmetry is associated with a higher probability of dyadic conflict. It is possible that nuclear proliferation decreases conflict through the conflict-mitigating effects of extended nuclear deterrence and/or fear of nuclear states' intervention, to the extent that these effects overwhelm the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear-asymmetrical dyads.…”

Section: Discussion and Concluding Remarkscontrasting

confidence: 73%

Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests

Suzuki

2015

Research & Politics

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In the literature on nuclear proliferation, some argue that further proliferation decreases interstate conflict, some say that it increases interstate conflict, and others indicate a non-linear relationship between these two factors. However, there has been no systematic empirical investigation on the relationship between nuclear proliferation and a propensity for conflict at the interstate-systemic level. To fill this gap, the current paper uses the machine learning method Random Forests, which can investigate complex non-linear relationships between dependent and independent variables, and which can identify important regressors from a group of all potential regressors in explaining the relationship between nuclear proliferation and the propensity for conflict. The results indicate that, on average, a larger number of nuclear states decrease the systemic propensity for interstate conflict, while the emergence of new nuclear states does not have an important effect. This paper also notes, however, that scholars should investigate other risks of proliferation to assess whether nuclear proliferation is better or worse for international peace and security in general.

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Section: Discussion and Concluding Remarkscontrasting

confidence: 73%

Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests

Suzuki

2015

Research & Politics

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“…With regard to the second strand, studies have been concerned with, among others: the relevance of assault weapon bans and weapon laws on murder rates (Gius 2014); assessments of whether nuclear weapons are worth having (Suni 2015); the nexus between nuclear strategy, nonproliferation, and nuclear deployment (Fuhrmann and Sechser 2014); questioning the effect of nuclear weapons on conflicts (Bell and Miller 2015); and security guarantees and nuclear proliferation (Bleek and Lorber 2015).…”

Section: La Persistencia De Las Armas: Evidencia Globalmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Persistence of Weapons: Global Evidence

2020

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This article investigates persistence (or hysteresis) in weapons using a panel of 163 countries for the period 2010‐15. The following are some main findings: (1) compared to countries that are landlocked, persistence in heavy weapons is more apparent in nations that are open to the sea; (2) relative to the Middle East and North Africa, heavy weapons are more persistent in the East Asia and the Pacific countries. This tendency is consistent with “weapons imports;” (3) evidence of persistence is not very apparent in “weapons imports” with the exception of the fact that it is higher in low‐income countries, compared to their high‐income counterparts. Hence, there is less hysteresis in weapons exports when compared with heavy weapons exports; and (4) the determinants of persistence employed in the conditioning information set are contingent on fundamental characteristics and panels. Policy implications are discussed. Related Articles Beal, Amanda L., and Leah Graham. 2014. “Foundations for Change: Rule of Law, Development, and Democratization.” Politics & Policy 42 (3): 311‐345. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12077 Fails, Matthew D. 2014. “Leader Turnover, Volatility, and Political Risk.” Politics & Policy 42 (3): 369‐399. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12078 Jakubow, Alexander. 2014. “State Intervention and Life Satisfaction Reconsidered: The Role of Governance Quality and Resource Misallocation.” Politics & Policy 42 (1): 3‐36. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12057 Peev, Evgeni, and Dennis C. Mueller. 2013. “Democracy, Economic Freedom and Growth in Transition Economies.” Kyklos 65 (3): 371‐407. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6435.2012.00543.x/abstract Siddiqui, Danish A., and Qazi M. Ahmed. 2013. “The Effect of Institutions on Economic Growth: A Global Analysis Based on GMM Dynamic Panel Estimation.” Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 24: 18‐33. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0954349X12000902

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“…For instance, our proposed method still delivers biased estimates if researchers use unreliable data, or faulty code and software. To illustrate, Bell and Miller (2015) could replicate Rauchhaus (2009)’s findings in Stata but not in R—an outcome they attribute to a problem in Stata. More perniciously, some researchers have been caught fabricating data.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Using Split Samples to Improve Inference on Causal Effects

Fafchamps

Labonne

2017

Polit. Anal.

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We discuss a statistical procedure to carry out empirical research that combines recent insights about preanalysis plans (PAPs) and replication. Researchers send their datasets to an independent third party who randomly generates training and testing samples. Researchers perform their analysis on the training sample and are able to incorporate feedback from both colleagues, editors, and referees. Once the paper is accepted for publication the method is applied to the testing sample and it is those results that are published. Simulations indicate that, under empirically relevant settings, the proposed method delivers more power than a PAP. The effect mostly operates through a lower likelihood that relevant hypotheses are left untested. The method appears better suited for exploratory analyses where there is significant uncertainty about the outcomes of interest. We do not recommend using the method in situations where the treatment are very costly and thus the available sample size is limited. An interpretation of the method is that it allows researchers to perform direct replication of their work. We also discuss a number of practical issues about the method’s feasibility and implementation.

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Questioning the Effect of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict

Cited by 102 publications

References 48 publications

Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests

Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests

The Persistence of Weapons: Global Evidence

Using Split Samples to Improve Inference on Causal Effects

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