2015
DOI: 10.1103/physreva.92.022337
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Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors

Abstract: Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and measurement-device-independent QKD. Here we present a third solution that might exceed the performance and practicality of the previous two in circumventing detector side-channel attacks, which arguably is the most hazardous part of QKD implementations. Our proposal has, however,… Show more

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Cited by 23 publications
(38 citation statements)
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“…Then with finite-key analysis, we reached a secure distance of 175 km, and the Secret key rate is 3.655 × 10 −7 /pulse. A complete Bell state measurement is performed in the protocol, which means that the protocol bears the same mathematical description and security level with the other SBSM-QKD schemes [26,27]. In this article, we have a comment on those papers.…”
Section: Fig 2 (Color Online) Experimental Schematic Diagram Bs: mentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Then with finite-key analysis, we reached a secure distance of 175 km, and the Secret key rate is 3.655 × 10 −7 /pulse. A complete Bell state measurement is performed in the protocol, which means that the protocol bears the same mathematical description and security level with the other SBSM-QKD schemes [26,27]. In this article, we have a comment on those papers.…”
Section: Fig 2 (Color Online) Experimental Schematic Diagram Bs: mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, SBSM-QKD may be more secure in some sense, compared to traditional QKD protocols, like BB84. For example, the security of SBSM-QKD can be proved even under the assumption that Eve can decide the output of the BSM device [26]. Thus, as a simple way to implement SBSM-QKD, our proposal is also not a MDI-secure one.…”
mentioning
confidence: 98%
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“…Recently a new QKD protocol, designed to bridge the strong security of MDI-QKD with the high efficiency of conventional QKD, was proposed by several groups [48][49][50]. In this protocol, the legitimate receiver employs a trusted linear optics network to encode information on photons received from an insecure quantum channel, and then performs a Bell state measurement (BSM) using untrusted detectors.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Note that a similar scheme, following the same basic idea, has been proposed elsewhere. 29 Our scheme, henceforth referred to as detector-device-independent QKD (ddiQKD), essentially follows the idea of mdiQKD; however, instead of encoding separate qubits into two independent photons, we exploit the concept of a two-qubit single-photon (TQSP). This scheme has the following advantages: (1) It requires only single-photon interference; (2) the linear-optical BSM is 100% efficient; 30 (3) the secret key rate scales linearly with the SPD detection efficiency; and (4) it is expected that in the finite-key scenario, the minimum classical post-processing size is similar to that of P&M QKD schemes.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%