The goal of fair division is to distribute resources among competing players in a "fair" way. Envy-freeness is the most extensively studied fairness notion in fair division. Envy-free allocations do not always exist with indivisible goods, motivating the study of relaxed versions of envy-freeness. We study the envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) property, which states that no player prefers the bundle of another player following the removal of any single good, and prove the first general results about this property. We use the leximin solution to show existence of EFX allocations in several contexts, sometimes in conjunction with Pareto optimality. For two players with valuations obeying a mild assumption, one of these results provides stronger guarantees than the currently deployed algorithm on Spliddit, a popular fair division website. Unfortunately, finding the leximin solution can require exponential time. We show that this is necessary by proving an exponential lower bound on the number of value queries needed to identify an EFX allocation, even for two players with identical valuations. We consider both additive and more general valuations, and our work suggests that there is a rich landscape of problems to explore in the fair division of indivisible goods with different classes of player valuations.removed; this is a thought experiment used in the definition of envy-freeness up to one good. An EF1 allocation always exists, and can be computed in polynomial time [20]. 1 Caragiannis et al. [10] proposed another fairness criterion, one which is strictly stronger than EF1, but strictly weaker than full envy-freeness. An allocation is envy-free up to any good (EFX) if for any i, j where player i envies player j, removing any good from j's allocation would eliminate i's envy. Do EFX allocations always exist? This paper takes the first steps toward answering this question.