Quantity implicatures in reference understanding

Abstract

Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (1993) propose a framework whereby different referring forms conventionally signal different cognitive statuses on an implica-tional 'givenness hierarchy'. Interaction of the hierarchy with Grice's Maxim of Quantity gives rise to scalar implicatures which further constrain the choice among forms and their interpretations when necessary conditions for more than one form are met. Wilson (1992) and Matsui (1995) show that reference assignment for NPs introduced by the definite article is constrained within Relevance Theory by the automatic selection of an interpretation that yields adequate contextual effects for minimal processing effort. This paper proposes that an optimal account of how people understand the intended referent of an NP must appeal to both the Givenness Hierarchy and Relevance Theory. Such an account still requires the first part of the Quantity Maxim, however, either as a socially based assumption or as part of the Principle of Relevance itself

Children's use of referring expressions: some implications for theory of mind

“…In some cases, the second part of Grice's Quantity Maxim (don't make your contribution more informative than required) blocks the implicature that the cognitive status encoded by a stronger form is not met. Thus, as discussed in Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (1993) and Gundel and Mulkern (1998), the definite article doesn't implicate non-familiarity. Since signaling that the addressee can uniquely identify the referent is usually sufficient to allow her to interpret it, given the encoded descriptive content and Relevance-driven pragmatic inferences (Matsui 1992, Sperber and Wilson 1995, Wilson 1992, the definite article typically provides sufficient information about cognitive status, and an explicit signal of familiarity (such a demonstrative determiner) is usually unnecessary.…”

Information structure and the accessibility of clausally introduced referents

“…Such facts follow from interaction of the Givenness Hierarchy with general pragmatic principles involved in language production and understanding (see Grice 1975, Sperber and Wilson 1986195). The implicational nature of the GH gives rise to 'scalar implicatures', in the sense of Horn (1972), which further restrict the distribution and interpretation of referring forms (see Gundel, et al 1993, Gundel andMulkern 1998). With this background, Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski propose that the possibility of reference with personal pronouns versus demonstratives depends on the cognitive status of the referent.…”

Information structure and the referential status of linguistic expression

“…Such facts follow from interaction of the Givenness Hierarchy with general pragmatic principles involved in language production and understanding (see Grice 1975, Sperber and Wilson 1986195). The implicational nature of the GH gives rise to 'scalar implicatures', in the sense of Horn (1972), which further restrict the distribution and interpretation of referring forms (see Gundel, et al 1993, Gundel andMulkern 1998).…”