Quantifying the Risk of Localised Animal Movement Bans for Foot-and-Mouth Disease

Schley, David; Gubbins, Simon; Paton, David

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005481

Cited by 20 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 14 publications

(22 reference statements)

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“…To estimate the zone size required for surveillance we applied the methods developed in Schley et al (2009), which allows calculation of the probability of LSDV escaping a zone of a given radius (i.e. a farm outside the zone becoming infected).…”

Section: Size Of Surveillance Areasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lumpy skin disease: scientific and technical assistance on control and surveillance activities

Calistri¹,

DeClercq²,

Vleeschauwer³

et al. 2018

EFS2

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The duration of the vaccination campaign sufficient to eliminate lumpy skin disease (LSD) mainly depends on the vaccination effectiveness and coverage achieved. By using a spread epidemiological model, assuming a vaccination effectiveness of 65%, with 50% and 90% coverage, 4 and 3 years campaigns, respectively, are needed to eliminate LSD. When vaccination effectiveness is 80% to 95%, 2 years of vaccination at coverage of 90% is sufficient to eliminate LSD virus (LSDV). For shorter campaigns, LSD is predicted to persist. When the infection is eliminated by vaccination, two pathways for disease recurrence are possible, (i) by new introduction from a neighbouring affected area, especially by introduction of infected animals, or, less likely (ii) the infection persisting either in the environment, in vectors or in wild animals. For planning surveillance, several elements should be considered: the objectives and related design prevalence, the epidemiological situation, the immunological status of the host population, the geographical area and the season, the type of surveillance (active or passive), the diagnostic methods including clinical detection (considered the most effective method for early detection of LSD), the target population, the sample size and frequency. According to the model, for early detecting new introductions of LSD, it may be needed to clinically check a large number of herds (e.g. 2–3,000 herds) monthly. Lower sample sizes can be considered, when a greater delay in detecting the virus is acceptable. Where vaccination is maintained, active surveillance for verifying the effectiveness of vaccination would be needed. Demonstrating disease absence can rely on serological surveillance, which should consider the test sensitivity, the design prevalence (estimated value: 3.5%), the onset and duration of serum antibodies. Important knowledge gaps on LSD are about within‐herd transmission, duration of protective immunity, role of vectors, diagnostic tests, farm location and type in the at‐risk countries and the epidemiological status of neighbouring countries.

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Section: Size Of Surveillance Areasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lumpy skin disease: scientific and technical assistance on control and surveillance activities

Calistri¹,

DeClercq²,

Vleeschauwer³

et al. 2018

EFS2

Self Cite

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“…The modelling approach developed by Schley et al (2009) was used to assess the size of the area that needs to be surveyed. The dispersal kernel (i.e.…”

Section: Approach Of Assessing Criteria For Regaining Shb-free Statusmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The probability of an outbreak escaping a surveillance zone covering a radius ranging from 0 to 200 km was explored using the analytical approach described in Schley et al (2009). The results are presented in Figure 10 using estimates for the spread of SHB obtained using the distance-only model.…”

Section: Effect Of Radius On the Probability Of Shb To Escape The Surmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Survival, spread and establishment of the small hive beetle (Aethina tumida)

2015

EFS2

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The small hive beetle (SHB) is still present in Calabria one year after its first detection in September 2014. Detailed epidemiological studies would improve our knowledge of the survival, spread and establishment of the pest. Movement of an infested hive could spread SHB rapidly over large distances. Modelling of SHB spread in absence of movement of hives, suggests that natural spread of the beetle alone will take more than hundred years to reach Abruzzo from Calabria (around 250 km). A model considering the ownership of multiple apiaries per beekeeper indicates that spread would be 10 times faster. Opportunity maps indicate that, once introduced, the SHB could complete its life cycle in all EU Member States between May and September. It is recommended that restrictions on the movement of honey bees, bumblebees and commodities from infested to non‐infested areas be maintained until SHB is eradicated, to prevent spread of the pest. Strengthening visual inspection, preventing infestation using a fine mesh and issuing a health certificate for intra‐EU trade of queen bees, within 24 hours before dispatch, could reduce the risk of SHB transmission via consignments. In general, visual inspection of the beehive, as described in this document, is the preferred method of detecting SHB. Traps could help to detect and reduce SHB infestation levels. Maintaining good honey house hygiene and good beekeeping practices are the most important measures to control SHB where eradication is no longer the objective, given that no approved veterinary medicine is available in the EU. A field experiment found natural infestation of commercial bumblebee (Bombus impatiens) colonies placed next to SHB‐infested honey bee hives. However, there are no data published on SHB infestation in natural bumblebee colonies. Studies are needed of the capacity of B. terrestris, occurring in Europe, to act as a SHB host.

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“…For instance, livestock movement (trade) controls have been implemented in response to the FMD outbreaks in the UK and other parts of the EU (Schley et al, 2009). Movement controls have also been imposed within parts of the UK, New Zealand, US, and elsewhere to prevent the spread of bTB (DEFRA, 2014; Barlow et al, 1998; MDARD, 2011; OIE, 2013), and in Canada to prevent spread of BSE (LeRoy et al, 2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing dynamic epidemiological risks through trade

Horan

Fenichel

Finnoff

et al. 2015

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

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There is growing concern that trade, by connecting geographically isolated regions, unintentionally facilitates the spread of invasive pathogens and pests – forms of biological pollution that pose significant risks to ecosystem and human health. We use a bioeconomic framework to examine whether trade always increases private risks, focusing specifically on pathogen risks from live animal trade. When the pathogens have already established and traders bear some private risk, we find two results that run counter to the conventional wisdom on trade. First, uncertainty about the disease status of individual animals held in inventory may increase the incentives to trade relative to the disease-free case. Second, trade may facilitate reduced long-run disease prevalence among buyers. These results arise because disease risks are endogenous due to dynamic feedback processes involving valuable inventories, and markets facilitate the management of private risks that producers face with or without trade.

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Quantifying the Risk of Localised Animal Movement Bans for Foot-and-Mouth Disease

Cited by 20 publications

References 14 publications

Lumpy skin disease: scientific and technical assistance on control and surveillance activities

Lumpy skin disease: scientific and technical assistance on control and surveillance activities

Survival, spread and establishment of the small hive beetle (Aethina tumida)

Managing dynamic epidemiological risks through trade

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