Quantified Interference for a While Language

Clark, David; Hunt, Sebastian; Malacaria, Pasquale

doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2004.01.018

Cited by 69 publications

(78 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…There have been various works [18][19][20][21][22] in which the high information and the low information are seen as the input and output respectively of a channel. From an abstract point of view, the setting is very similar; technically it does not matter what kind of information we are trying to conceal, what is relevant for the analysis is only the probabilistic relation between the input and the output information.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anonymity Protocols as Noisy Channels

Chatzikokolakis

Palamidessi

Panangaden

Trustworthy Global Computing

109

196

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We consider a framework in which anonymity protocols are interpreted as noisy channels in the information-theoretic sense, and we explore the idea of using the notion of capacity as a measure of the loss of anonymity. Such idea was already suggested by Moskowitz, Newman and Syverson, in their analysis of the covert channel that can be created as a result of non-perfect anonymity. We consider the case in which some leak of information is intended by design, and we introduce the notion of conditional capacity to rule out this factor, thus retrieving a natural correspondence with the notion of anonymity. Furthermore, we show how to compute the capacity and the conditional capacity when the anonymity protocol satisfies certain symmetries. We also investigate how the adversary can test the system to try to infer the user's identity, and we study how his probability of success depends on the characteristics of the channel. We then illustrate how various notions of anonymity can be expressed in this framework, and show the relation with some definitions of probabilistic anonymity in literature. Finally, we show how to compute the matrix of the channel (and hence the capacity and conditional capacity) using model checking.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anonymity Protocols as Noisy Channels

Chatzikokolakis

Palamidessi

Panangaden

Trustworthy Global Computing

109

196

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“…Other pioneers on the use of information theory in the context of security are Dennings, McLean and Millen [9,8,20,21]. In recent years, a theoretical framework has been established based on Shannon's information theory to allow static, quantitative program analysis that provides an expectation of leakage in programs [15,16,17,23]. The theory is preliminarily extended to multi-threaded programs [13].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Information theory can be used to quantify the leakage in programs [15,16,17,13]. Generally speaking, the leakage of a system is the difference between the amount of original confidential information and the amount of remaining confidential information after observations.…”

Section: Information Leakage Of Multi-threaded Programsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Optimum Leakage Principle for Analyzing Multi-threaded Programs

Chen

Malacaria

2010

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. Bellman's optimality principle is a method for solving problems where one needs to find best decisions one after another. The principle can be extended to assess the information leakage in multi-threaded programs, and is formalized into the optimum leakage principle hereby proposed in this paper. By modeling the state transitions in multithreaded programs, the principle is combined with information theory to assess the leakage in multi-threaded programs, as the result of an optimal policy. This offers a new perspective to measure the information leakage and enables to track the leakage at run-time. Examples are given to demonstrate the analysis process. Finally, efficient implementation of this methodology is also briefly discussed.

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“…We mention in particular [1] which explores the relation between probability and nondeterminism, and [3] which extends of the notion of probable innocence. A related line of work is directed at exploring the application of information-theoretic concepts [24,12,20,21,29,5,10,19,15,8,9,17,18,2]. The relation with hypothesis testing is given by the fact that the exponential of the conditional entropy is an upper bound of the Bayes risk (the probability of error using the MAP rule) [23,4], although [26] has pointed out that the bound can be in some case very loose.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bounds on the Leakage of the Input’s Distribution in Information-Hiding Protocols

Bhowmick

Palamidessi

2009

Trustworthy Global Computing

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Abstract. In information-hiding, an adversary that tries to infer the secret information has a higher probability of success if it knows the distribution on the secrets. We show that if the system leaks probabilistically some information about the secrets, (that is, if there is a probabilistic correlation between the secrets and some observables) then the adversary can approximate such distribution by repeating the observations. More precisely, it can approximate the distribution on the observables by computing their frequencies, and then derive the distribution on the secrets by using the correlation in the inverse direction. We illustrate this method, and then we study the bounds on the approximation error associated with it, for various natural notions of error. As a case study, we apply our results to Crowds, a protocol for anonymous communication.

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Quantified Interference for a While Language

Cited by 69 publications

References 2 publications

Anonymity Protocols as Noisy Channels

Anonymity Protocols as Noisy Channels

The Optimum Leakage Principle for Analyzing Multi-threaded Programs

Bounds on the Leakage of the Input’s Distribution in Information-Hiding Protocols

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