Quality of financial reporting in the Indian insurance industry: Does corporate governance matter?

Abstract

This study explores the relationship between financial reporting quality and insurer governance, with the hypothesis that robust governance procedures exert better control over managers’ opportunistic behavior. The analysis is based on a dataset of insurer firms from 2014 to 2021. The econometric results obtained using the two‐step system GMM technique reveal that the overarching influence of corporate governance on enhancing financial reporting quality is evident, with board and risk governance matters the most. Among individual governance attributes, the optimal board size, a higher proportion of independent directors, audit and risk committees’ size, and risk committee independence play a significant role in governing discretionary accruals. The efficacy of governance mechanisms considerably differs across life and non‐life insurers, shedding light on the nuanced dynamics within the Indian insurance market. The results lend empirical support to resource dependency and agency theories within the Indian insurance sector. The implications suggest potential avenues for amending or redesigning governance norms with specificities of insurers and the ultimate goal of fostering an environment conducive to enhancing the reporting quality of Indian insurance firms.