Quality of Corporate Governance on Dividend Payouts: The Case of Nigeria

Abstract

Corporate governance (CG) safeguards shareholders' portfolios and ensures optimal returns in terms of dividend payouts (DPs) on investment. The association between CG and DPs could be significant in relation to risk exposure, operational and financing activities across firms and sectors. The relationship between CG and DPs has been well documented, however; the role of industry classification on the relationship has not been given adequate consideration in the literature. This study, therefore, examines the moderating effects of sector classification of CG on DPs in Nigeria. Agency theory underpins the model which captures the effects of CG on DPs. Governance indicators and dividend per share of 97 non-financial listed companies in Nigeria from 1995-2012 are utilized. The system generalized method of moments estimation technique is employed in the analysis. The empirical findings indicate a positive association between CG and DP. Additionally, the analysis underlines the importance of the mode of operations (sector classification) in the relationship between CG practices and DPs in Nigeria. Based on the results of the study, it is suggested that more independent directors should be on the boards of corporate firms and the proportion of institutional shareholding also be increased to improve monitoring.

Corporate Governance Research in Nigeria: A Review

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The story of dividend payment and corporate cash flow in Ghana

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Financial distress and non‐executive director compensation: Evidence from state‐owned enterprises in South Africa post King III

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