Quality assurance in safe automation

2021

Self Cite

High integrity protective systems (HIPS) are often introduced into the process design package during late‐stage engineering for a new process or integrated with installed equipment in an existing process unit. The decision to use HIPS in addition to, or as an alternative to, a pressure relief device for a particular hazard scenario is generally based on a combination of factors, including technical, regulatory, and capital costs. This paper discusses functional, design, engineering, operation, and maintenance considerations that should be factored into the decision process when choosing HIPS to protect against overpressure scenarios.

Section: Counting On Hipsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Choosing HIPS over PRD: It is more than risk reduction

2021

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“…Proof of safe operation is gathered by monitoring and reporting actual performance over the life of a process. Benchmarked values provide an initial basis and rationale for the design, but operating history yields the actual frequency of root causes (or initiating causes), process deviations (or initiating events), and work orders related to safeguards (or failures on demand) . Data feedback to the risk analysis process is critical to credible decision‐making.…”

Section: Functional Safety Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk assessment challenges to 20:20 vision

2014

Decision makers need reproducible, believable results to support investment decisions. A wide variety of hazard identification and risk analysis methods are available to support process safety decisions. All methods require knowledge in the fundamentals of process design and experience in the process operation under consideration. Every method has uncertainty and no method yields any better reflection of the risk than the level of engagement that the analyst or team has in the assessment. Traditional approaches work well on processes with a long history of operation, but are difficult to apply in the rapidly evolving environment of modern manufacturing. This article discusses the challenges that the risk analysis process is facing in today's work environment. These challenges include understanding that the calculations are only a model for process safety events that harm people, events with low calculated likelihood can still occur, and management systems with metrics are critical to sustain the performance of the identified protection layers. These challenges are met by adapting current tools and work processes for recording process data to also collect data on abnormal operation and protection layer failure.

“…Do not get lost in the numbers. All quality control processes need metrics [9]. The level of precision required in establishing the metric must be balanced with the level of precision possible in the monitoring of the metric.…”

Section: Be Definite Now Worry About Precision Latermentioning

confidence: 99%

Safety management is a virtue

2009

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It is undeniable that safe operation and process reliability are not only compatible but highly interrelated. Reliable production units rarely have safety incidents, whereas unreliable ones tend to repeatedly experience abnormal operation. To prevent incidents, personnel, procedures, and equipment must be aligned to facilitate rapid identification and response to failures of the control system and protective safeguards. Safe and reliable performance requires minimization of the root causes that lead to abnormal and emergency operation. The challenges to accomplishing this in a timely manner are considerable, but not insurmountable. This article discusses various challenges to sustaining safe operation of process equipment. Each challenge is introduced using a philosophical saying from a Chinese fortune cookie to remind the reader that the barriers against progress are not new but have existed from many years. In most cases, the solutions are also well known and generally require deployment of robust equipment, proven techniques, and competent resources. © 2009 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 2009