Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of CFTs Taking Security Causes into Account

Steiner, Max; Liggesmeyer, Peter

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-24249-1_10

“…The analysis proposed by [18] is based on FMEA that considers only single causes of an effect, which excludes multi-stage attacks consideration. The method presented by Popov (2015) [28] may require a more complex [24], [32], [40], [45], [46] [11], [33] Unified [6], [13], [15], [17], [23], [25], [34], [36], [39], [41], [42], [43], [35], [49] [10], [12], [18], [21], [26], [28], [29], [31], [37], [38], [44], [47] failure model to address failure dependencies and trade-offs between safety and security. The approach proposed by Wei et al (2015) [31] has a limitation in terms of failures connections.…”

Section: B Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By considering probabilistic modelling of both failures and attacks it is possible to quantify the risk from cyber attacks. 15) Steiner and Liggesmeyer (2015) [29] propose a Security Enhanced Component Fault Trees (SECFTs) analysis. In order to assign probabilities to security related causes, i.e., to conduct a quantitative analysis, basic events are grouped into minimal cut sets (MCSs), and probabilities are assigned to sets instead of events.…”

Section: ) Raspotning Et Al (2012) [10] Present Combined Harmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Safety and Security Co-Analyses: A Systematic Literature Review

Lisova

¹

,

Šljivo

²

,

Čaušević

³

2019

IEEE Systems Journal

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Latest technological trends lead towards systems connected to public networks even in critical domains. Bringing together safety and security work is becoming imperative, as a connected safety-critical system is not safe if it is not secure. The main objective of this study is to investigate the current status of safety and security co-analysis in system engineering by conducting a Systematic Literature Review. The steps of the review are the following: the research questions identification; agreement upon a search string; applying the search string to chosen databases; a selection criterion formulation for the relevant publications filtering; selected papers categorization and analysis. We focused on the early system development stages and identified 33 relevant publications categorized as: combined safety and security approaches that consider the mutual influence of safety and security; safety informed security approaches that consider influence of safety on security; security informed safety approaches that consider influence of security on safety. The results showed that a number of identified approaches are driven by needs in fast developing application areas, e.g., automotive, while works focusing on combined analysis are mostly application area independent. Overall, the study shows that safety and security co-analysis is still a developing domain.

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“…The analysis proposed by [18] is based on FMEA that considers only single causes of an effect, which excludes multi-stage attacks consideration. The method presented by Popov (2015) [28] may require a more complex [24], [32], [40], [45], [46] [11], [33] Unified [6], [13], [15], [17], [23], [25], [34], [36], [39], [41], [42], [43], [35], [49] [10], [12], [18], [21], [26], [28], [29], [31], [37], [38], [44], [47] failure model to address failure dependencies and trade-offs between safety and security. The approach proposed by Wei et al (2015) [31] has a limitation in terms of failures connections.…”

Section: B Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Safety and Security Co-Analyses: A Systematic Literature Review

Lisova

¹

,

Šljivo

²

,

Čaušević

³

2019

2019 IEEE 43rd Annual Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Latest technological trends lead towards systems connected to public networks even in critical domains. Bringing together safety and security work is becoming imperative, as a connected safety-critical system is not safe if it is not secure. The main objective of this study is to investigate the current status of safety and security co-analysis in system engineering by conducting a Systematic Literature Review. The steps of the review are the following: the research questions identification; agreement upon a search string; applying the search string to chosen databases; a selection criterion formulation for the relevant publications filtering; selected papers categorization and analysis. We focused on the early system development stages and identified 33 relevant publications categorized as: combined safety and security approaches that consider the mutual influence of safety and security; safety informed security approaches that consider influence of safety on security; security informed safety approaches that consider influence of security on safety. The results showed that a number of identified approaches are driven by needs in fast developing application areas, e.g., automotive, while works focusing on combined analysis are mostly application area independent. Overall, the study shows that safety and security co-analysis is still a developing domain.

show abstract

“…Other proposals suggest to make a combine use of attack trees and fault trees. Steiner and Liggesmeyer [23] have extended the qualitative and quantitative safety analysis to take in consideration the influence of security problems on the safety of a system. They introduced "SECFT" (that stands for Security Event Component Fault Tree), a component fault tree that contains both safety and security events.…”

Section: State Of the Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimizing System Architecture Cost and Security Countermeasures

Berro

¹

,

Apvrille

²

,

Duc

³

2019

Graphical Models for Security

1

0

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The design of an embedded system is built on a trade-off between its performance and its cost. Nowadays, the security threats that target most of the embedded systems introduce a new factor in this trade-off: the security level of the system. So system architects must consider, during the design, the different attacks that target the system and the possible countermeasures, and their costs. In this article, we present a methodology to help designers explore different countermeasures and evaluate their impact on the cost of the architecture and the probability of success of an adversary. This methodology is based on extended and formalized Attack-Defense Trees that allow to assess the impact of countermeasures on system components and attacks. We use propagation rules to characterize a main attack from its different steps, and we formalize the trade-off between security and cost by an optimization problem between attack probability and total architecture cost.

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Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of CFTs Taking Security Causes into Account

Cited by 14 publications

References 6 publications

Safety and Security Co-Analyses: A Systematic Literature Review

Safety and Security Co-Analyses: A Systematic Literature Review

Safety and Security Co-Analyses: A Systematic Literature Review

Optimizing System Architecture Cost and Security Countermeasures

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