Q&A in legislative oversight: A framework for analysis

Abstract

Parliamentary questions are an essential tool of legislative oversight. However, the extent to which they are effective in controlling the executive remains underspecified both theoretically and methodologically. This article advances a systematic framework for evaluating the effectiveness of parliamentary questions drawing on principal-agent theory, the public administration literature on accountability and communication research. The framework is called the 'Q&A approach to legislative oversight' based on the premise that the study of parliamentary questions (Q) needs to be linked to their respective answers (A) and examined together (Q&A) at the microlevel as an exchange of claims between legislative and executive actors. Methodologically, the Q&A approach to legislative oversight offers a step-by-step guide for qualitative content analysis of Q&A that can be applied to different legislative oversight contexts at different levels of governance. It is argued that the effectiveness of Q&A depends on the strength of the questions asked and the responsiveness of answers provided, which are correspondingly operationalised. To illustrate the merits of the approach, the article includes a systematic case study on the relationship between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank in banking supervision (2013)(2014)(2015)(2016)(2017)(2018), showing the connection between specific institutional settings and the effectiveness of parliamentary questions.

Parliamentary questions, institutional change, and legislative oversight in a non‐Western context

“…Hence, legislative oversight is a two‐way process in which MPs ask the questions and each question requires an answer from the executive. This is the only way in which PQs can be effective (Maricut‐Akbik, 2021). In the UAE, the FNC has a peculiar status.…”

“…In most Western countries, the institution of PQs is accepted and routinely used to oversee public bureaucracy and the executive. However, non‐Western countries have struggled to develop PQs into a useful and meaningful tool of legislative oversight (Maricut‐Akbik, 2021; Rozenberg et al., 2021). How legislatures can utilize their limited parliamentary authority to oversee the executive has not been addressed in the literature.…”

“…Some researchers respond that these criticisms focus on marginal issues rather than the overall change itself and its contribution to the development of institutions' missions, structures, and functions (Koreh et al., 2019). Critics of rationalism argue that self‐interest and personal gain do not always motivate MPs' behavior; however, Maricut‐Akbik (2021, p. 542) notes that, regardless of the motives for institutional change, parliaments gain legitimacy, legislative power, and influence over public policy making.…”

The European Parliament as an Accountability Forum

“…The two dimensions are correspondingly operationalised and developed into six possible scenarios of oversight interactions, ranging from 'High control' to 'No control' over the executive (cf. Maricut-Akbik 2021). The goal of the framework is to provide a theoretically and methodologically consistent toolkit for analysing and evaluating oversight interactions, which can also be applied beyond the EP to other contexts of legislativeexecutive relations at different levels of governance.…”

“…For a full overview of the codebook, please see the Online Appendix of the article 'Q&A in legislative oversight'(Maricut-Akbik 2021).3.4 Methodological Considerations…”