2012
DOI: 10.1111/j.1748-5991.2012.01155.x
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Pyramids and the value of generality

Abstract: Responsive Regulation advocates a differentiated style of regulation and enforcement that is more responsive to the behavior of the regulated parties than a system of general or uniform rules. This article investigates whether such a differentiated approach can be reconciled with the traditional ideal of general law. On the basis of a conceptual analysis of generality, it is argued that the notion of generality is at best tautological and not inconsistent with a differentiated approach to regulation and enforc… Show more

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Cited by 13 publications
(13 citation statements)
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“…As these examples suggest, even voluntary transnational regulatory programs vary widely in the generality or target‐specificity of their norms (Westerman ).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As these examples suggest, even voluntary transnational regulatory programs vary widely in the generality or target‐specificity of their norms (Westerman ).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In her paper, “Pyramids and the Value of Generality,” Pauline Westerman () addresses another potential problem with the enforcement pyramid – differential treatment of regulatees because of the flexibility of regulatory decisionmaking recommended by the pyramid. Accountability for the exercise of discretion in decisionmaking has already been addressed copiously and diversely in the empirical and legal literature on regulation (Davis ; Lipsky ; Wilson ; Hawkins ; Yeung ; Piore ; Pires ).…”
Section: The Ambition and Ambiguity Of Responsive Regulation: The Pyrmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The intentionally disparate regulatory treatment created by tradable licenses raises the kinds of inequality concerns raised by Westerman (). One response to this concern is that ex ante , the regulation is not treating subjects differently because they all have the same legal opportunity to acquire the licenses.…”
Section: Regulation By Chancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…So I will try to be brief. I hope to use a discussion of two regulatory strategies in the flavor of RR (which eschew one‐size‐fits‐all command and control), as a means of pointing to future directions for the RR project and as a way to comment briefly on the contributions of Etienne (), Ford (), and Westerman (). More specifically, I will address two regulatory strategies: “licensing disparate regulatory treatment,” and “regulation by chance,” which are related to the RR concept of the partial‐industry regulation idea that it might at times be valuable to intentionally impose different forms of regulation on different parts of a regulated interest.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%