Pyramidal Groups and the Separation Between Ownership and Control in Italy

Bianchi, Marcello; Bianco, Magda; Enriques, Luca

doi:10.1093/0199257531.003.0006

Cited by 143 publications

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“…In Italy, the investigation by Bianchi, Bianco, and Enriques (2001) shows that in 1996 more than 50% of…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Control-Enhancing Mechanisms in Italian Companies

Intrisano

2012

CUBR

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Dual class systems, shareholder agreements and pyramid structures are legal devices whereby shareholders are able to separate voting rights from cash flow rights. These practices are used to strengthen the decision-making power of a small number of controlling shareholders to the potential detriment of many minority shareholders, whose vote becomes ineffective. In this way, controlling shareholders have the possibility of influencing or dictating corporate governance with the higher majority of voting rights that they obtain. These mechanisms are very different from each other and this paper demonstrates that regulatory changes, regarding the protection of shareholders which occurred in the Italian market from 1999 to 2007, have produced different effects on the mechanisms of separation between ownership and control, especially with regard to their diffusion among companies. In the same way, this work provides evidence that these mechanisms have the fact that they are more popular in larger companies in common, due to their higher needs of equity associated to the acquisition of control.Thus, the idea of this study is to analyze and measure the implementation of dual class systems, shareholder agreements and pyramid structures in Italian listed companies between 1999 and 2007.

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“…In Italy, the investigation by Bianchi, Bianco, and Enriques (2001) shows that in 1996 more than 50% of…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Control-Enhancing Mechanisms in Italian Companies

Intrisano

2012

CUBR

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“…Becht and Röell (1999) provide a summary of the main findings of this network. For individual country studies see Becht and Böhmer (1999), , Bianchi et al (1999), Bloch and Kremp (1999), Crespí-Cladera and Garcia-Cestona (1999), De Jong et al (1999), Goergen and Renneborg (1999) and Gugler et al (1999).…”

Section: Ownership Structure and Corporate Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Blockholdings and Corporate Governance in the EU Banking Sector

Köhler

2009

SSRN Journal

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp08110.pdf Non-Technical SummaryOwnership structures widely differ across the EU. While large blockholdings dominate in the banking sector in Continental Europe, ownership is widely dispersed in the United Kingdom. These differences have consequences for corporate governance in the EU banking sector. This paper analyzes the efficiency of shareholder control and hostile takeovers as corporate governance mechanisms in the EU banking sector against the background of the regulatory environment and differences in the ownership structure of banks. Particular attention is put on current trends in the ownership structure of banks (e. g. sovereign wealth funds). The paper is based on a new dataset on shareholdings in listed banks in the EU banking sector.The results indicate that EU regulations have not always improved corporate governance in the banking sector. While shareholder control has been improved by a better protection of minority shareholder rights, the efficiency of the takeover market has been reduced in Continental Europe. Das Wichtigste in Kürze Blockholdings and Corporate Governance in the EU Banking Sector Matthias Köhler Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)December 2008 Abstract:Ownership structures widely differ across the EU. While large blockholdings dominate in the banking sector in Continental Europe, ownership is widely dispersed in the United Kingdom. These differences have consequences for corporate governance in the EU banking sector. This paper analyzes the efficiency of shareholder control and hostile takeovers as corporate governance mechanisms in the EU banking sector against the background of the regulatory environment and differences in the ownership structure of banks. Particular attention is put on current trends in the ownership structure of banks (e. g. sovereign wealth funds). The paper is based on a new dataset on shareholdings in listed banks in the EU banking sector.The results indicate that EU regulations have not always improved corporate governance in the banking sector. While shareholder control has been improved by a better protection of minority shareholder rights, the efficiency of the takeover market has been reduced in Continental Europe.

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“…3 As already mentioned in the introduction, Italian companies are characterized by a high level of ownership concentration. According to Bianchi et al (1997), in 1992 the largest shareholder of manufacturing companies owned on average approximately 66% of a company and the three largest shareholders owned more than 90%.…”

Section: Institutional Framework and Relevant Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the other hand, even if the pursuit of e¢ciency is a common objective for all types of owners, they might di¤er in the ability to provide e¤ective monitoring and incentive schemes to the top management. 5 5 Another candidate explanation is grounded on the idea that it is performance that a¤ects 5 …”

Section: Institutional Framework and Relevant Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does ownership affect firms? efficiency? Panel data evidence on Italy

Bottasso

Sembenelli

2004

Empirical Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This paper provides empirical evidence on the relation between the identity of ultimate owners and technical (in)efficiency by estimating stochastic production frontiers on Italian firm level panel data for twelve manufacturing industries over the 1978-93 period. Privately-owned independent firms are used as reference group and their efficiency is assessed against three alternative forms of ownership: subsidiaries of (privately owned) national business groups, subsidiaries of foreign multinationals, and state owned firms. Even if cross-industry differences obviously exist a common pattern can however be identified. Overall, subsidiaries of foreign multinationals (state owned firms) are found to be more (less) efficient than the reference group. On the contrary, no systematic difference is found between independent firms and subsidiaries of national business groups. Terms of use: Documents in

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Pyramidal Groups and the Separation Between Ownership and Control in Italy

Cited by 143 publications

References 0 publications

Control-Enhancing Mechanisms in Italian Companies

Control-Enhancing Mechanisms in Italian Companies

Blockholdings and Corporate Governance in the EU Banking Sector

Does ownership affect firms? efficiency? Panel data evidence on Italy

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