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AbstractThe Spanish business code allowed firms great flexibility in their organizational form in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Until 1920, firms had the same basic choices as in France and some other European countries, namely, the corporation, the ordinary partnership, or the limited partnership. But Spanish law was unusually flexible, allowing firms to adapt the corporation especially to the needs of its owners. Starting in
Spanish firms could also organize as a Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada(SRL), a form similar to the German GmbH or the British Private Limited Company (PLC). But some firms had already adopted the form prior to 1920. The Spanish coded lacked the principle of "numerus clauses" that is central to many areas of law. Most business codes allow firms to choose only from a proscribed menu of options. The Spanish code offered these options but also stated that firms could organize in other ways if they wished. This paper uses three empirical sources to study the way firms actually used those possibilities. We find that this flexibility did not make entrepreneurs indifferent across the different organizational forms.
JEL codes: K20, N43, N44Keywords: Spanish economic history, legal form of enterprise, law and finance 3 Spain was one of the poorest and least developed countries in western Europe as late as the 1950s. Several sets of reasons have been advanced for this relative poverty. This paper examines a specific version of the view that Spanish institutions constrained economic growth. We study the relationship between company law and the organization of multi-owner firms, first by tracing the evolution of organizational law in Spain from 1886 to 1936, and then by using three different empirical sources to study the way the different organizational forms were used by Spanish business.Our study spans a period that includes the considerable repatriation of capital from the (former)Spanish empire, as well as the introduction of a new legal form for business, the private limitedliability company. We end our study in 1936 because of the Spanish Civil War.We are interested in two questions. Our story is related to a more general interest in the differences between common-law and civillaw traditions. An influential literature argues that countries with a civil-law legal tradition do worse in fostering a climate that leads to investment, and more generally in economic growth. La Port...