Putting the Common Security and Defense Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean under Scrutiny: Türkiye’s Conflicting Role

Abstract

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new global security and economic environment (Defence budgets’ decline, imminent threats from the Gulf War and NATO’s quest for a new identity), provided a window of opportunity for establishing and designing the EU’s security institution. Thus, what was initially considered farfetched after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, entered a new phase, which included perception transformation, to be gradually incorporated into daily discourse. Hence, the 2003 “European Security Strategy”, the 2010 “Internal Security Strategy”, and later the 2016 “Global Strategy” reflect Member States’ perception of transformation and their belief that the EU needs a Common Security and Defence Strategy approach. Given these documents that indicate determination for notable integration and institutional restructuring, this analysis delves into the impact of Europeanisation concerning the implementation of institutional reforms and the CSDP. More specifically, this analysis probes the constraints of Europeanisation concerning the EU’s real operational dynamics, especially in light of the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Sea security challenges. These challenges are examined in relation to Türkiye’s revisionist public diplomacy, public policies, and the militarization of its foreign policy (including ongoing negotiations centered on migratory flows, assertions, and constructed narratives over Greek and Cypriot islands and seas). The situation has become more pronounced following the identification of gas and oil reserves in the area in 2010. This analysis has a two-fold focus: Firstly, to investigate Europeanisation impact on the operational implementation of CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) in time of crisis, and secondly, to evaluate the behavior of Türkiye within the Europeanisation framework, as proposed by Radaelli and Violakis.