Putting modal metaphysics first

Mallozzi, Antonella

doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1828-2

Cited by 17 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“… 12 Mallozzi (2018) also defends this assumption and in particular explores its epistemological implications, focusing on examples of eternal Kinds. Kment (2014) is another who ties modal essences to explanation: however, for him this is part of a broader account of modality in terms of metaphysical laws , including ontological laws governing mereology and grounding; moreover, while Kment does appeal to causal considerations, he does not invoke the specific super-explanatory causal role that is our focus.…”

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confidence: 99%

Essential Properties Are Super-Explanatory: Taming Metaphysical Modality

Godman¹,

Mallozzi²,

Papineau

2020

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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This article aims to build a bridge between two areas of philosophical research: the structure of kinds and metaphysical modality. Our central thesis is that kinds typically involve super-explanatory properties, and that these properties are therefore metaphysically essential to natural kinds. Philosophers of science who work on kinds tend to emphasize their complexity, and are generally resistant to any suggestion that they have essences. The complexities are real enough, but they should not be allowed to obscure the way that kinds are typically unified by certain core properties. We show how this unifying role offers a natural account of why certain properties are metaphysically essential to kinds.

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confidence: 99%

Essential Properties Are Super-Explanatory: Taming Metaphysical Modality

Godman¹,

Mallozzi²,

Papineau

2020

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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“…We are using Fine's subscripted box notation ' x P' which reads: 'P is true in virtue of the essence of x'.15 See alsoMallozzi (2018).…”

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The epistemology of modality and the problem of modal epistemic friction

Vaidya

Wallner

2018

Synthese

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There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention over the past 20 years (1998-2018): conceivability-theory, counterfactualtheory, and deduction-theory. In this paper we argue that all three face what we call the problem of modal epistemic friction (PMEF). One consequence of the problem is that for any of the three accounts to yield modal knowledge, the account must provide an epistemology of essence. We discuss an attempt to fend off the problem within the context of the internalism versus externalism debate about epistemic justification. We then investigate the effects that the PMEF has on reductive and non-reductive theories of the relation between essence and modality.

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“…Many also see in metaphysical theories the key to solving the epistemological questions concerning modalities. Examples include grounding modal knowledge on essences (Hale, 2013;Kment, 2021a;Lowe, 2012;Mallozzi, 2021a), being committed to a form of modal realism (Lewis, 1986), or truth-indicative modal imagination (Berto, 2017;Chalmers, 2002Chalmers, , 2010Ichikawa & Jarvis, 2012;Kung, 2010;Yablo, 1993). But this seems to put the cart before the horse, for it assumes that in order to know such ordinary modal facts like "it is possible to break a teacup" or scientific modal claims like "superluminal signaling is impossible", we would need a metaphysical account of the relevant aspects of the world.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Contrary to most philosophical accounts of modality, we focus explicitly on modal claims made in science. Rather than starting with strong philosophical assumptions (see, e.g., Lewis, 1986;Chalmers, 2002;Lowe, 2012;Hale, 2013;Mallozzi, 2021a;Kment, 2021a), we feel that the epistemology of modality should benefit from paying closer attention to the scientific practice of constructing and evaluating modal inferences. The reasons for this are twofold.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modal inferences in science: a tale of two epistemologies

2021

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Recent epistemology of modality has seen a growing trend towards metaphysics-first approaches. Contrastingly, this paper offers a more philosophically modest account of justifying modal claims, focusing on the practices of scientific modal inferences. Two ways of making such inferences are identified and analyzed: actualist-manipulationist modality (AM) and relative modality (RM). In AM, what is observed to be or not to be the case in actuality or under manipulations, allows us to make modal inferences. AM-based inferences are fallible, but the same holds for practically all empirical inquiry. In RM, modal inferences are evaluated relative to what is kept fixed in a system, like a theory or a model. RM-based inferences are more certain but framework-dependent. While elements from both AM and RM can be found in some existing accounts of modality, it is worth highlighting them in their own right and isolating their features for closer scrutiny. This helps to establish their relevant epistemologies that are free from some strong philosophical assumptions often attached to them in the literature. We close by showing how combining these two routes amounts to a view that accounts for a rich variety of modal inferences in science.

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Putting modal metaphysics first

Cited by 17 publications

References 52 publications

Essential Properties Are Super-Explanatory: Taming Metaphysical Modality

Essential Properties Are Super-Explanatory: Taming Metaphysical Modality

The epistemology of modality and the problem of modal epistemic friction

Modal inferences in science: a tale of two epistemologies

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