Putting It All Together

The U.S. Army and the Battle for Baghdad: Lessons Learned — And Still to Be Learned

“…To help with the task, according to a former senior military commander, McKiernan was given a dream team-with hand-selected general officers to fill out his staff. 97 The name they gave the nascent ground plan was Cobra II, an allusion to American forces' breakout from the Normandy beachhead shortly after the invasion of Europe during World War II. 98 Cobra II called for a two-pronged assault into Iraq.…”

“…96 At the same time, Bremer and CPA also fell outside the State Department's reporting channels. 97 Indeed, the reason that Bremer, a former diplomat, was picked for the position-as opposed to a currently serving diplomat-was because some in the Bush administration felt that the State Department could not be trusted with the task. As one former senior national security official recounted, There was a bias in the White House and DoD against having anyone in the State Department's Near East Asia bureau, which had a reputation of being against 93 Former senior State Department and CPA official, interview with the authors, June 3, 2015.…”

“…For example, Meghan O'Sullivan, an NSC staffer on the Iraq portfolio, kept a chart in her office that tracked levels of violence in Baghdad's neighborhoods to demonstrate visually the problems of the military's strategy. 97 To bring the President around to the same conclusion, the NSC sent him memos on a nightly basis outlining the flaws in the strategy and analytically showing that when the U.S. military applied force, violence declined. 98 The evidence that the NSC presented to Bush contradicted the military's strategy, which was to bring down levels of violence by standing up the ISF.…”

“…At the same time that the manual was being finalized for publication, a growing bevy of voices could be heard from the NSC, certain military experts, and retired Army officers arguing that Iraq was burning in civil war because the U.S. forces under Casey 96 Former senior national security official, interview with the authors, September 25, 2015. 97 Woodward, 2008a, p. 68. did not do counterinsurgency operations correctly. In this worldview, Iraq demanded a new strategy because Casey's was apparently failing.…”

“…As one former senior national security official recalled, after the Surge decision, "my focus shifted primarily to the political side of the Surge, holding together the [Republican] votes on the hill to keep the Surge alive." 97 Even so, Congress came close to defunding the war during the summer of 2007 and barely was convinced to hold off 91 Douglas Lute, interview with Mathew Wharton, undated, p. 11, transcript provided to RAND by the OIF Study Group. 92 Douglas Lute, interview with Mathew Wharton, undated, p. 12, transcript provided to RAND by the OIF Study Group.…”