Pure Intentionalism about Moods and Emotions

Abstract

Moods and emotions are sometimes thought to be counterexamples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods and emotions are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods and emotions on which (1) directed moods and emotions represent intentional objects as having sui generis affective properties, which happen to be uninstantiated, and (2) at least some moods represent affective properties not bound to any objects. * This paper is forthcoming in Uriah Kriegel (ed.) Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind, Routledge. targets. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist theory of the phenomenal character of moods and emotions. On the view I will defend, (1) emotions and some moods represent intentional objects as having sui generis affective properties that happen to be uninstantiated, and (2) like concepts, but unlike most perceptual representations, affective representations can be tokened without binding to any object representations, yielding undirected moods. The paper proceeds as follows: §2 clarifies some key notions, §3 provides an intentionalist account of emotions, and §4 provides an intentionalist account of directed and undirected moods. 2 Moods, emotions, and intentionalism Emotions are affective states that seem to be directed at something. Examples include fear of a dog, joy about an upcoming event, and guilt about a wrong one has committed. Emotions tend to be fairly short-lived and are usually caused by a specific stimulus, which may or may not be what they are directed at. Moods are affective states that do not seem to be directed at anything. Exampes include happiness, sadness, and anxiety. Moods tend to be longer-lasting than emotions, and are usually not associated with a specific stimulus. 1 For most moods, there is a corresponding phenomenally similar emotion. For example, an anxious mood is phenomenally similar to anxiety about something, say an upcoming event. 2 Intentionalism is the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are reducible to, supervenient on, type or token identical to, or determined by its representational features. Loosely, the idea is that phenomenal consciousness is nothing over and above mental representation. 1 What distinguishes moods from emotions is a matter of some controversy. The various criteria proposed for distinguishing between them (their duration, whether they exhibit directedness, and whether they are connected to a specific stimulus) can come apart (see Kind, this volume). For most purposes, it might be best to assume that moods and emotions are natural kinds and to fix reference on them partly ostensively by use of examples or typical features. Since my goal is to provide an intentionalist account of all affective states, everything I say should apply equally well ...

The Phenomenal Character of Emotional Experience: A Look at Perception Theory

“…However, this move might seem ad hoc and implausible (see Kind , 126f. ; Mendelovici , 150). The proponent of intentionalism faces the challenge of presenting independent grounds for his claim that if an emotion intensifies, there also is a change in its intentionality.…”

“…To many emotion theorists this latter option probably does not seem very attractive. Nevertheless, it is endorsed by Uriah Kriegel and Angela Mendelovici who both propose versions of pure intentionalism about emotions (see Kriegel ; Mendelovici ).…”

“…Mendelovici, in contrast, denies that emotions represent their objects as instantiating certain response‐dependent properties (see Mendelovici , 143). Instead she suggests that

affective properties are sui generis, perhaps primitive or basic (scariness, annoyingness, joyfulness, etc.).

…”

“…Mendelovici believes that the affective properties represented in the content of emotion are akin to David J. Chalmers' Edenic properties (see Chalmers ) and that it is quite implausible that objects ever instantiate Edenic affective properties (see Mendelovici , 144). This entails that according to Mendelovici our emotions constantly misrepresent the world (see Ib., 145).…”

“…9 I am by no means the only one who is aware of the connection between the ILT in the philosophy of emotion and intentionalism in the philosophy of mind. Kriegel and Mendelovici, for instance, both defend pure intentionalism about emotions and do so with reference to the ILT (see Kriegel 2002 andMendelovici 2014).…”