Puppetnets

Abstract

Most of the recent work on Web security focuses on preventing attacks that directly harm the browser's host machine and user. In this paper we attempt to quantify the threat of browsers being indirectly misused for attacking third parties. Specifically, we look at how the existing Web infrastructure (e.g., the languages, protocols, and security policies) can be exploited by malicious Web sites to remotely instruct browsers to orchestrate actions including denial of service attacks, worm propagation and reconnaissance scans. We show that, depending mostly on the popularity of a malicious Web site and user browsing patterns, attackers are able to create powerful botnet-like infrastructures that can cause significant damage. We explore the effectiveness of countermeasures including anomaly detection and more fine-grained browser security policies.

Attacking the Internet Using Broadcast Digital Television

“…A malicious adversary cannot sign webpages on behalf of the website under attack and thus cannot claim these sites as its origin. Unfortunately, even if all broadcast content was properly assigned to a restricted web origin, many attacks would still be possible via "blind" CSRF or PuppetNet attacks [Lam et al 2006]. These attacks can cause considerable damage, even if the same-origin principle is upheld, by the sheer virtue of being able to access the Internet using somebody else's computer.…”