Punishment without reason: Isolating retribution in lay punishment of criminal offenders.

Abstract

Research has suggested that criminal punishment decisions are driven primarily by retribution and that retributive judgments are achieved by a process of abstract moral reasoning. However, problems with construct validity limit confidence in these conclusions. Study 1 (N = 254) used experimentally manipulated vignettes to isolate retributive motives. Participants' sentencing recommendations were strongly provoked by indices of retribution (criminal intent) even when the most common consequentialist reasons for punishment (offender dangerousness and publicity of punishment) were minimized. In an exploratory fashion, Study 2 (N = 49) used a semistructured interview to examine whether participants would persist in punishing a hypothetical offender without explicit reasons. Participants persisted in their original punishment judgments even when unable to justify the reasons for these judgments. These results increase confidence that lay punishment is motivated by retribution, but also suggest that this motive may be better explained by fallible, heuristic processes than by abstract moral reasoning. Implications for legal policy are discussed.

Judging the Goring Ox: Retribution Directed Toward Animals

“…But this research has not adequately isolated retribution as a motive for punishment. Thus, the use of these more sensitive, continuous scales revealed what Carlsmith et al's (2002) forced choice procedure could not, and substantially complicates the interpretation of Carlsmith et al's past research on the retributive motive, as well as other similar research (e.g., Aharoni & Fridlund, 2012). However, crime severity, intent, and extenuating circumstances are also extremely relevant to deterrence and incapacitation, even if they are perceived to be slightly more relevant to retribution.…”

Are ‘Optimistic’ Theories of Criminal Justice Psychologically Feasible? The Probative Case of Civic Republicanism

“…Our review of the extant psychological evidence thus strongly militates against the view that we have a brutely retributive Realpsychologie. And yet despite the encouraging tenor of these results, there is real and persisting evidence across a broad range of studies that people are susceptible, both in theory and in practice, to purely retributive impulses (Aharoni and Fridlund 2012;Carpenter et al 2001;Crockett et al 2014;Cullen et al 2000;Hartnagel and Templeton 2012;Hough et al 1998;Keller et al 2010;Nadelhoffer et al 2013). We do not want to underestimate how strong and persistent these impulses may be.…”

“…whether punishment leads to deterrence; for a review see Carlsmith and Darley 2008). These retributive reactions occur intuitively and heuristically (Aharoni and Fridlund 2012;Carlsmith 2006;Darley 2009).…”

To punish or repair? Evolutionary psychology and lay intuitions about modern criminal justice

“…This selection pressure favored the evolution of psychological mechanisms designed to counter exploitation of one’s self, family, and social group through punishment (Boehm 1985; Daly & Wilson 1988; Frank 1988; Duntley & Buss 2004; Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides 2009; Petersen, Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides 2010; McCullough, Kurzban, & Tabak 2011). Modern crimes have features that satisfy the input conditions of mechanisms designed to respond to exploitation, and recent research suggests that our evolved counterexploitation psychology structures the intuitions that modern individuals have about criminal justice (Aharoni & Fridlund, 2011; Petersen et al 2010; Robinson, Kurzban, & Jones 2007). This research has documented high levels of cross-cultural agreement concerning the seriousness of different crimes (Robinson et al 2007).…”

“…This research has documented high levels of cross-cultural agreement concerning the seriousness of different crimes (Robinson et al 2007). Furthermore, with considerable supporting evidence, it has been argued that this perceived seriousness taps into our evolved sense of justice, such that individuals prefer sanctions that are proportional to the seriousness of the crime (e.g., Darley & Pittman 2003; Aharoni & Fridlund 2011). …”