Punishment in the form of shared cost promotes altruism in the cooperative dilemma games

Zhu, Yezi; Chen, Zengqiang; Zhang, Jianlei

doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.03.006

Cited by 13 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…Avoiding second-order free riding by introducing an entrance fee was analyzed in [15]. A set of the cooperators was randomly selected to perform as punishers in [27], the cost of punishing was shared between cooperators in [28], and a ceiling payoff for defectors was introduced to promote cooperation in [29,30].…”

Section: Sanctioning Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fractional Punishment of Free Riders to Improve Cooperation in Optional Public Good Games

Botta

Blanco

Schaerer

2021

Games

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Improving and maintaining cooperation are fundamental issues for any project to be time-persistent, and sanctioning free riders may be the most applied method to achieve it. However, the application of sanctions differs from one group (project or institution) to another. We propose an optional, public good game model where a randomly selected set of the free riders is punished. To this end, we introduce a parameter that establishes the portion of free riders sanctioned with the purpose to control the population state evolution in the game. This parameter modifies the phase portrait of the system, and we show that, when the parameter surpasses a threshold, the full cooperation equilibrium point becomes a stable global attractor. Hence, we demonstrate that the fractional approach improves cooperation while reducing the sanctioning cost.

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Section: Sanctioning Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fractional Punishment of Free Riders to Improve Cooperation in Optional Public Good Games

Botta

Blanco

Schaerer

2021

Games

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“…One direction to explore is how the cost is born. Instances include those where cost are not only undertaken by the punishers, but also by those from higher hierarchies, the third party, or even cooperators 47 , 60 . Another way to consider is the punishment not always implemented, such as the coordination of punishment or the probabilistic execution 30 , 61 .…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Individual mobility promotes punishment in evolutionary public goods games

Cong

Zhao

et al. 2017

Sci Rep

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In explaining the pressing issue in biology and social sciences how cooperation emerges in a population of self-interested individuals, researchers recently pay intensive attentions to the role altruistic punishment plays. However, as higher-order cooperators, survival of punishers is puzzling due to their extra cost in regulating norm violators. Previous works have highlighted the importance of individual mobility in promoting cooperation. Yet its effect on punishers remains to be explored. In this work we incorporate this feature into modeling the behavior of punishers, who are endowed with a choice between leaving current place or staying and punishing defectors. Results indicate that optimal mobility level of punishers is closely related to the cost of punishing. For considerably large cost, there exists medium tendency of migration which favors the survival of punishers. This holds for both the direct competition between punishers and defectors and the case where cooperators are involved, and can also be observed when various types of punishers with different mobility tendencies fight against defectors simultaneously. For cheap punishment, mobility does not provide with punishers more advantage even when they are initially rare. We hope our work provide more insight into understanding the role individual mobility plays in promoting public cooperation.

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How intergroup relation moderates group bias in Third-Party Punishment

Gong

Ding

2020

Acta Psychologica

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Punishment in the form of shared cost promotes altruism in the cooperative dilemma games

Cited by 13 publications

References 40 publications

Fractional Punishment of Free Riders to Improve Cooperation in Optional Public Good Games

Fractional Punishment of Free Riders to Improve Cooperation in Optional Public Good Games

Individual mobility promotes punishment in evolutionary public goods games

How intergroup relation moderates group bias in Third-Party Punishment

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