Punishment: Consequentialism

Wood, David

doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00287.x

Cited by 8 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…In contrast, utilitarian motives are forward-looking, focusing not on the past wrongdoing but the beneficial consequences of the punishment (Bentham, 1830/1998; Wood, 2010). While there are numerous proposals for what precisely the beneficial consequences of punishment are, psychologists have focused on two: deterrence – punishment deters the offender or other would-be criminals from committing similar offenses in the future; incapacitation – while the offender is undergoing punishment (e.g., incarceration), they will not be able to commit further crimes.…”

Section: Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Testing the Intuitive Retributivism Dual Process Model

Rehren

Zisman

2022

Zeitschrift für Psychologie

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Abstract. Research on the motives individuals have to punish criminal offenders suggests that punitive reactions are primarily driven by retributive, not utilitarian, motives. To explain this, several authors have suggested a dual process model (DPM) of punitive reactions. According to this model, punitive reactions are the product of two distinct types of processing (type I and type II), which differentially support retributive vs. utilitarian punishment motives. In response to cases of criminal wrongdoing, type I swiftly outputs a retributive reaction. In contrast, for utilitarian motives to play a role, this reaction has to be overridden by type II processing, which only happens rarely. In this article, we argue that despite its popularity, there is little concrete evidence for the DPM. We then report the results of a preregistered study investigating the effect of increased processing effort on retributive vs. utilitarian punitive reactions. We argue that the results fail to support the DPM.

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Section: Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Testing the Intuitive Retributivism Dual Process Model

Rehren

Zisman

2022

Zeitschrift für Psychologie

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“…Negative retributivism, he said, provides not solely that only the guilty may be punished, but also “that even one who is guilty must not be punished to a degree that is out of proportion to his guilt” (Mackie 1982, p. 4). Similarly, David Wood (2010, p. 465) glosses RCP as insisting, inter alia, that “we never impose disproportionately harsh punishment on the guilty.” This is the most plausible and attractive proportionality principle for responsibility‐constrained pluralists. I'll designate this principle PoP‐RCP.…”

Section: An Alternativementioning

confidence: 99%

Principles of Proportionate Punishment: Comments on John Deigh, From Psychology to Morality: Essays in Ethical Naturalism

Berman

2022

Philos Phenomenol Research

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John Deigh's new volume of previously published essays covers expansive ground—from moral psychology to the history of ethics, from James, Nietzsche and Freud to Hume, Sidgwick, and Strawson. Fully one quarter of the book, however, explores the philosophy of punishment. Deigh's dominant concern in this portion of the book is to develop and defend a novel principle of proportionality in punishment, one which provides that the severity of just punishment is a function of the damage the offense threatens or inflicts on the civil order. That is a welcome project, for philosophers of punishment widely agree that proportionality remains an elusive concept. Yet whether Deigh has solved the puzzle is uncertain. This essay raises doubts and sketches an alternative solution.

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“…Thus, it seems that blame-related practices should, in some way, depend on blameworthiness after all. Insisting on this connection might be motivated by the punishing the innocent objection, which is often addressed at consequentialist theories of punishment (Wood 2010a(Wood , 2010b): If, for example, considerations of deterrence would guide practices of blame without further reference to blameworthiness, it would be permissible to punish the innocent. The intuitive moral reprehensibility of this constitutes the standard objection to consequentialist theories of punishment, which focus on the possible effects of the institution of punishment and other blaming responses.…”

Section: Fairness and The Need For A More Extensive Axiology Of Blamementioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Luck and Unfair Blame

Sand

Klenk

2021

J Value Inquiry

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Killer drove drunk and, for reasons beyond his control, killed a child that ran onto the street. Merely Reckless also drove drunk but, for reasons beyond his control, was lucky and killed nobody. Suppose that the outcome in each case differs solely due to factors beyond the agents' control. Still, these factors supposedly influence the respective moral praise-and blameworthiness of both agents: Killer seems more blameworthy than Merely Reckless, and so the latter is morally lucky. However, it is also widely accepted that only things within one's control shall determine how praise-and blameworthy one is; accordingly, there should be no moral luck.These conflicting beliefs about agents' praise-and blameworthiness constitute the problem of moral luck. Scholars frequently pose the problem in alethic terms, following Nagel (1979: 27), who considers moral luck as a paradoxical but "natural consequence of the ordinary idea of moral assessment." Enoch and Marmor (2007: 406) describe the problem as a dilemma between what Enoch later (2010: 43) dubs as "contrasting families of intuitive judgements." More recently, Hartman (2019: 227, emphasis added) writes that "the problem of moral luck is a contradiction in our common-sense ideas about moral responsibility." 1 Thus, it is suggested that it is paradoxical that responsibility should be luck-free (or in other words-as Williams (1981: 21) put it-morality must be absolutely fair) and yet our assessment and treatment of people often differ depending on the consequences and circumstances of their acts over which they had no control.A recent proposal to resolve the paradox of moral luck distinguishes between judging blameworthy (to wit, assessing someone's moral status) and blame-related

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Punishment: Consequentialism

Abstract: Punishment involves deliberating harming individuals. How, then, if at all, is it to be justified? This,

Cited by 8 publications

References 40 publications

Testing the Intuitive Retributivism Dual Process Model

Testing the Intuitive Retributivism Dual Process Model

Principles of Proportionate Punishment: Comments on John Deigh, From Psychology to Morality: Essays in Ethical Naturalism

Moral Luck and Unfair Blame

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