2016
DOI: 10.1177/1462474516645690
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Punishment and political systems: State punitiveness in post-dictatorial Greece

Abstract: Extant research on the relationship between political systems and state punitiveness has so far paid little attention to the impact that transition from one political system to another may have upon levels and patterns of state punitiveness. This risks not only exaggerating the degree to which given trends in state punitiveness are distinct to particular political systems, but also overlooking the legacy that punitive policies, practices or experiences under a prior political system may bequeath its successor.… Show more

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Cited by 16 publications
(23 citation statements)
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References 69 publications
(95 reference statements)
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“…From 1996, when relevant data were first made available, to 2014, the caseload of non-Greek convicts rose by a spectacular 288.3 percent, from 2253 to 8750, with the proportion of non-Greeks in the country’s caseload of convicted prisoners coming to exceed that of Greeks themselves, rising from 25.3 to 55.0 percent. Leaving aside immigration-related convictions, the above trends are to be explained by reference to reforms that increased sentence severity and restricted parole eligibility, combined with intensified police activity and punitive decision-making on the part of judges, particularly against non-Greeks (see, further, Cheliotis, 2011; Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2010, 2016; Xenakis and Cheliotis, 2013). 3…”
Section: Before the Left: Imprisonment Before Syriza In Powermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…From 1996, when relevant data were first made available, to 2014, the caseload of non-Greek convicts rose by a spectacular 288.3 percent, from 2253 to 8750, with the proportion of non-Greeks in the country’s caseload of convicted prisoners coming to exceed that of Greeks themselves, rising from 25.3 to 55.0 percent. Leaving aside immigration-related convictions, the above trends are to be explained by reference to reforms that increased sentence severity and restricted parole eligibility, combined with intensified police activity and punitive decision-making on the part of judges, particularly against non-Greeks (see, further, Cheliotis, 2011; Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2010, 2016; Xenakis and Cheliotis, 2013). 3…”
Section: Before the Left: Imprisonment Before Syriza In Powermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The year that Greece joined the Council of Europe saw the conclusion of a four-year civil war in the country, which itself had followed a five-year right-wing military dictatorship . Decades of illiberal rule were to continue against the broader backdrop of the Cold War: emergency anti-communist legislation that originated during the Greek Civil War was only formally abolished in 1962, and its harsh provisions were all too quickly revived by the country's military junta of 1967-74 (see further Cheliotis and Xenakis 2016).…”
Section: Greek Non-compliance With the European Human Rights Regime: mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Second, and yet more obviously, there remains the challenge of adapting existing models or creating new ones to explain how penal policy is determined in emerging economies and transitional systems such as those of South America, South Africa or Eastern Europe (Iturralde 2007;Sparks et al (ed. ) 2011; Whitfield 2016), or indeed in the mixed market economies of Southern Europe (Gallo 2015;Cheliotis & Xenakis 2016). Important work, including on political economy models on which comparative criminologists might build, is beginning to emerge (see, for example, Schneider 2013).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%