Punishment and disagreement in the state of nature

Barrett, Jacob

doi:10.1017/s0266267119000233

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 35 publications

(43 reference statements)

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“…For this view, see Gert (1965Gert ( , 1967, McNeilly (1966), or Chung (2016). Barrett (2020) has also recently expressed concurrence with this idea.…”

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confidence: 85%

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Unravelling into war: trust and social preferences in Hobbes’s state of nature

Schaefer

Sohn

2021

Economics and Philosophy

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According to Hobbes, individuals care about their relative standing in a way that shapes their social interactions. To model this aspect of Hobbesian psychology, this paper supposes that agents have social preferences, that is, preferences about their comparative resource holdings. Introducing uncertainty regarding the social preferences of others unleashes a process of trust-unravelling, ultimately leading to Hobbes’s ‘state of war’. This Trust-unravelling Model incorporates important features of Hobbes’s argument that past models ignore.

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“…For this view, see Gert (1965Gert ( , 1967, McNeilly (1966), or Chung (2016). Barrett (2020) has also recently expressed concurrence with this idea.…”

mentioning

confidence: 85%

“…37 Some commentators have taken this as evidence that Hobbes was not a psychological egoist. See, for example, Chung (2016) or Barrett (2020).…”

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confidence: 99%

Unravelling into war: trust and social preferences in Hobbes’s state of nature

Schaefer

Sohn

2021

Economics and Philosophy

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“…Considering the importance of punishment for costly-norm enforcement (Boyd and Richerson, 1992;Boyd et al, 2010;Mathew, 2017;Mathew and Boyd, 2011) and the potential for multiple punishing coalitions to emerge in a society and engage in conflict (Barrett, 2020), we are interested in understanding the conditions under which a meta-population characterized by a previously stabilized norm, 1, is stable to the invasion of a novel behavior and potential norm, 2.…”

Section: Deterministic Conflict Resolutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The problem Panchanthan and Boyd identify is not a new one. Locke, in offering decentralized and norm-based punishment as an alternative to Hobbes' centralized Leviathan, emphasized the potential for conflict among factions that prefer distinct norms to in turn disrupt social-order (Barrett, 2020). Assuming that individuals adopt higher-payoff strategies, then in order for the red-berry convert to alter its group's norm, it would need to engage in and win normative conflict with the resident strategies, punishing those who do not eat red berries.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Normative Conflict and Normative Change

Noblit¹,

Hadfield²

2023

Preprint

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Human life is riddled with norms, many though not all of which are costly for individuals to adopt. Similarly, human ecological adaptation relies on costly-behaviors that often generate non-rivalrous and non-exclusionary benefits for group-members. Yet, in a dynamic world, innovations, environmental change, and information-revelation mean that what norms are beneficial for a group to adopt will inevitably change over time. However, multiple game-theoretic models studying the various mechanisms stabilizing normative behaviors have demonstrated that the stability of a norm does not depend on the benefits it confers. In turn, explanations of normative change have either relied on group-selective mechanisms to explain the presence of adaptive norms or have failed to identify conditions under which normative change occurs. We study normative change by means of costly-punishment and conflict resolution. We identify social differentiation in goals and punishment capacity as a key condition permitting normative change. While normative change that results from such social differentiation need not be group beneficial it will be beneficial to some subset of agents in the population. We additionally discuss how the intra-societal forces of normative conflict that we study might interact with group-selective forces and in turn determine the dynamics and outcomes of group-selection.

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“… 3. In doing so, this paper contributes to a growing literature that analyzes Locke’s political theory using the tools of modern economics (e.g., Barrett, 2020; Bruner, 2020; Chung, 2020; Kogelmann and Ogden, 2018; Van der Vossen, forthcoming). …”

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confidence: 99%

Lockeans against labor mixing

Kogelmann

2021

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

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The idea that labor mixing confers property in unowned resources is, for many, the very heart of the Lockean system of property. In this essay I shall argue that this common view is mistaken. Lockean theorists should reject labor mixing as the preferred method of first appropriation, and should adopt a different account of first appropriation instead. This is because labor mixing does not serve the central justification for the institution of property embraced by Lockeans. Thus, my argument is internal to the Lockean system; I rely only on premises that (many) Lockean theorists embrace. Though Lockeans should forsake labor mixing, that does not mean they should give up on property rights and the idea of first appropriation. In the paper’s final section, I sketch an account of first appropriation that Lockeans should embrace.

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Punishment and disagreement in the state of nature

Cited by 7 publications

References 35 publications

Unravelling into war: trust and social preferences in Hobbes’s state of nature

Unravelling into war: trust and social preferences in Hobbes’s state of nature

Normative Conflict and Normative Change

Lockeans against labor mixing

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