Pulse Rate Monitoring Using Narrowband Received Signal Strength Measurements

Abrar, Alemayehu Solomon; Luong, Anh; Hillyard, Peter; Patwari, Neal

doi:10.1145/3360773.3360876

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Among several channel measurements employed in most commercial wireless systems, RSS is considered to be the most widely available measurement across diverse wireless platforms [35]. RSS has been applied in various RF sensing applications including acoustic eavesdropping [11], device-free localization [17], contact-free vital sign monitoring [36], [31], security & surveillance [37], activity and gesture recognition [38], [23], and home monitoring [32]. In [11], signal strength measurements using a software-defined platform are used to eavesdrop acoustic vibrations from large speakers.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantifying Interference-Assisted Signal Strength Surveillance of Sound Vibrations

Abrar¹,

Patwari²,

Kasera³

2020

Preprint

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A malicious attacker could, by taking control of internet-of-things devices, use them to capture received signal strength (RSS) measurements and perform surveillance on a person's vital signs, activities, and sound in their environment. This article considers an attacker who looks for subtle changes in the RSS in order to eavesdrop sound vibrations. The challenge to the adversary is that sound vibrations cause very low amplitude changes in RSS, and RSS is typically quantized with a significantly larger step size. This article contributes a lower bound on an attacker's monitoring performance as a function of the RSS step size and sampling frequency so that a designer can understand their relationship. Our bound considers the littleknown and counter-intuitive fact that an adversary can improve their sinusoidal parameter estimates by making some devices transmit to add interference power into the RSS measurements. We demonstrate this capability experimentally. As we show, for typical transceivers, the RSS surveillance attacker can monitor sound vibrations with remarkable accuracy. New mitigation strategies will be required to prevent RSS surveillance attacks.

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