PUFFIN: A Novel Compact Block Cipher Targeted to Embedded Digital Systems

Cheng, Huiju; Heys, Howard M.; Wang, Cheng

doi:10.1109/dsd.2008.34

Cited by 44 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…To compose the transition matrix, cryptanalyst must identify the important linear trails of the cipher. We consider this problem for two SPN block ciphers PRESENT [5] and PUFFIN [13].…”

Section: Practical Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More details on the specification can be found in [5]. The lightweight block cipher PUFFIN was introduced in [13]. It is defined as a 64-bit SPN block cipher parametrised with a 128-bit key.…”

Section: Description Of the Ciphersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is defined as a 64-bit SPN block cipher parametrised with a 128-bit key. The round function as described in [13] is applied 32 times 2 . The structure of this cipher is similar to the one of PRESENT.…”

Section: Description Of the Ciphersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The validity of these assumptions is then tested on a reduced-round version of PRESENT and PUFFIN [13].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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New Links between Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis

Blondeau

Nyberg

2013

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. Recently, a number of relations have been established among previously known statistical attacks on block ciphers. Leander showed in 2011 that statistical saturation distinguishers are on average equivalent to multidimensional linear distinguishers. Further relations between these two types of distinguishers and the integral and zero-correlation distinguishers were established by Bogdanov et al. [6]. Knowledge about such relations is useful for classification of statistical attacks in order to determine those that give essentially complementary information about the security of block ciphers. The purpose of the work presented in this paper is to explore relations between differential and linear attacks. The mathematical link between linear and differential attacks was discovered by Chabaud and Vaudenay already in 1994, but it has never been used in practice. We will show how to use it for computing accurate estimates of truncated differential probabilities from accurate estimates of correlations of linear approximations. We demonstrate this method in practice and give the first instantiation of multiple differential cryptanalysis using the LLR statistical test on PRESENT. On a more theoretical side, we establish equivalence between a multidimensional linear distinguisher and a truncated differential distinguisher, and show that certain zerocorrelation linear distinguishers exist if and only if certain impossible differentials exist.

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“…To compose the transition matrix, cryptanalyst must identify the important linear trails of the cipher. We consider this problem for two SPN block ciphers PRESENT [5] and PUFFIN [13].…”

Section: Practical Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Description Of the Ciphersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Description Of the Ciphersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The validity of these assumptions is then tested on a reduced-round version of PRESENT and PUFFIN [13].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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New Links between Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis

Blondeau

Nyberg

2013

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…Mroczkowski and Szmidt have attacked the Courtois Toy Cipher CTC, designed by Courtois [39] against the cube attack [40,41]. Lightweight block ciphers which are not evaluated against the cube attack so far include LED [42], EPCBC [43], PRINCE [44], Piccolo [45], mCrypton [46], TWIS [47], MIBS [48], CGEN [49], PRINTcipher [50], KLEIN [51], FOX [52], HIGHT [53], ICEBERG [54], LCASE [55], MISTY [56], PUFFIN [57], SEA [58], TEA [59] and CLEFIA [60].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Security of LBlock against the Cube Attack and Side Channel Cube Attack

Islam

Afzal

Rashdi

2013

Security Engineering and Intelligence Informatics

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Abstract. In this research, a recently proposed lightweight block cipher LBlock, not tested against the cube attack has been analyzed. 7, 8 and 9 round LBlock have been successfully attacked with complexities of O(2 10.76 ), O(2 11.11 ) and O(2 47.00 ) respectively. For the case of side channel cube attack, full version of LBlock has been attacked using a single bit leakage model with the complexity of O(2 55.00 ) cipher evaluations. For this purpose, a generic practical platform has been developed to test various stream and block ciphers against the latest cube attack.

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