Public Service Reform in Malta, 1988‐95: Lessons to be Learned

Abstract

Malta's latest round of administrative reform has produced mixed results. While it has achieved more than any previous initiative, vital elements of the reform program have not been carried out and results have fallen short of initial expectations.The reform initiative yields a number of lessons, some of which have already been brought to light-the need to keep the reform agenda small, the need for sustained political backing-nd others which are less well known, such as the dificulty of creating an efective authority to direct reform, and the drawbacks to giving reform agencies lavishfunding and a high profile.The preparations to implement Malta's 1988 administrative reform initiative were impressively thorough. Three new organizations were set up to act as change agencies. Funds were voted on a generous scale. Acabinet committee was established to monitor implementation. All the prerequisites for successful reform seemed in place, and hopes for change were high.Several years later, those hopes have not been fulfilled. The changes that have taken place are radical by previous standards, and activity continues. But serious setbacks have been suffered in core areas of the reform program, and these will be very difficult to overcome.This article outlines the course of the reform initiative up to the end of 1995 and evaluates the changes that were brought about. It also attemptswith the benefit of hindsight-to assess whether different approaches could have yielded better results. This is done in the light of lessons emerging from the literature on administrative reform. Malta's experience itself adds a few lessons to the accumulated wisdom on the subject.As Caiden (1991) notes, evaluating the outcome of a reform initiative is a risky undertaking because it depends on one's perspective. Results may be compared with the goals proclaimed by reformers, which are almost certain to remain partly m e t . Or the results may be compared with the way things were before, in which case considerable progress can become evident. Those in the cockpit of reform will favor the latter perspective. They may feel that the former-which they might well label "the view from the armchair"-nails them to the cross of unattainable goals and fails to take account of the constraints within which they have to work.

L'indice de responsabilisation en matière de gestion financière (FMAI) dans le secteur public malais : une voie a suivre

“…Dans le contexte des pays en développement, « même si beaucoup tentent de promouvoir la responsabilité à l'égard du public dans le cadre de la réforme du secteur public, leur situation laisse encore à désirer par rapport aux pays avancés » (Kim, 2009;Manning, 2001;Polidano, 1999;Siddiquee, 2005). Parmi ces pays en développement, il y a la Malaisie (Siddiquee, 2005), le Bangladesh (Sarker, 2006;Siddiquee, 2003), l'Ouganda (Langseth, 1995), le Chili (Parry, 1997, la Ghana (Christiansen, 1998;Dodoo, 1997), le Sri Lanka (McCourt, 2007 et Malte (Polidano, 1996). Même s'il est vrai que ces réformes ont permis d'améliorer la prestation de service public dans une certaine mesure, il semble que différentes questions tout aussi importantes (voire plus importantes) n'aient pas été suffisamment prises en compte, comme le système de responsabilisation, la corruption et la mauvaise gestion, la décentralisation et la participation communautaire, ainsi que le respect des règles et de la réglementation (Siddiquee, 2002).…”