Public service integration in hard times: Merging unemployment benefit and labour market activation measures

Abstract

The creation of Intreo as a one-stop shop for jobseekers in Ireland occurred during the financial and sovereign debt crisis period of 2010–16. The organisational merger was the product of an extensive programme of successful administrative reorganisation and service integration that deserves attention. This article begins with an overview of the policy to merge insurance-based unemployment benefit, discretionary social welfare payments and labour market activation measures, as well as the various political and institutional rationales that led to this development. Drawing on the special issue framework concerning how the interaction of ideology, institutions and interests comes into play during policy change, we consider the contextual factors that facilitated the rapid implementation of the programme and its overall successful execution. Whilst focusing on the success, we also critically point out the inhibitors in the implementation chain, some of which predated the crisis, as well as problems during the implementation process, such as delays in the national rollout and back-office supports. We identify the main contributing factors for successful implementation of a one-stop shop for activation and unemployment services as (a) a high problem pressure, (b) a small and agile implementation team, (c) changing labour relations (e.g. binding arbitration, weakened unions) and (d) a modern communication strategy.

Introduction: The dual tracks of welfare and activation reform – Governance and conditionality

“…They also reflect a consensus among administrative and policy elites that a work-first, sanctions-oriented activation model was overdue in Ireland (Grubb et al, 2009;McGuinness et al, 2011). Indeed, there was a widespread view that Ireland was a 'laggard' (Köppe & MacCarthaigh, 2019;Wiggan, 2015) or 'outlier' (Dukelow & Considine, 2014b;Millar & Crosse, 2018). The OECD likened Ireland's pre-crisis activation regime to 'the emperor who had no clothes' (Martin, 2015, p. 9), in that there was only minimal implementation of the formal policy commitments to activation under Ireland's National Employment Action Plan.…”

“…Two entirely new services, Intreo and JobPath, have been created in conjunction with significant changes to the way in which externally delivered programmes are procured. Administrative responsibility for service commissioning has also been centralised within the Department of Social Protection (DSP) following the dissolution of FÁS in the wake of a corporate governance scandal, and the consolidation of income and employment supports (Köppe & MacCarthaigh, 2019). This integration of employment and income support was already standard in European countries, and the OECD review of Irish activation urged the government 'to gain better control of its own administration' by following suit (Grubb et al, 2009, p. 95).…”

‘Double activation’: Workfare meets marketisation

“…One of the most significant post-2011 public sector reform initiatives was the creation of Intreo (Köppe & MacCarthaigh, 2019). This unfolded against the backdrop of a FÁS governance and corporate travel expenses scandal, which culminated in the resignation of its director (Köppe & MacCarthaigh, 2019).…”

“…One of the most significant post-2011 public sector reform initiatives was the creation of Intreo (Köppe & MacCarthaigh, 2019). This unfolded against the backdrop of a FÁS governance and corporate travel expenses scandal, which culminated in the resignation of its director (Köppe & MacCarthaigh, 2019). FÁS was subsequently dissolved, and its employment services functions consolidated with DSP's benefits administration services to create a new one-stop service.…”

Sacrificial citizens? Activation and retrenchment in Ireland’s political economy

“…In contrast to longer and multiple waves of reform occurring elsewhere in Europe, Ireland underwent a much more rapid and compressed phase of change. The speed and scope of change, and the overall capacity to institute change, were certainly notable (Köppe & MacCarthaigh, 2019). Yet in some ways it might be said that the country followed its particular style of 'crisis routine' (van Hooren et al, 2014).…”