Public sector pay and corruption: Measuring bribery from micro data

Gorodnichenko, Yuriy; Peter, Klara Sabirianova

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.12.003

Cited by 176 publications

(128 citation statements)

References 34 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

121

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Although most studies concentrate on US data, similar results are obtained for other countries (e.g. Pederson et al, 1990;Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1993;Melly, 2005;Gorodnichenko and Peter, 2007).…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 61%

The politicians’ wage gap: insights from German members of parliament

2012

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Using a unique dataset of German members of parliament (MPs) this paper analyzes the politicians' wage gap (PWG). After controlling for observable characteristics as well as accounting for election probabilities and campaigning costs, we find a positive income premium for MPs which is statistically and economically significant. Our results are consistent with the citizen candidate model: The PWG amounts to 35-65% when comparing MPs to citizens in an executive position. However, it shrinks to zero when restricting the control group to top-level executives. This suggests that German politicians do not receive excessive pay when compared to senior executives.JEL Classification: D72, H11, H83, J31, J45

show abstract

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 61%

The politicians’ wage gap: insights from German members of parliament

2012

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…As also argued by Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2007), the perception-based indices of corruption do not provide a robust estimation of bribery within countries. However, these indicators remain informative for dynamics or aggregate comparison across countries.…”

Section: Basic Factsmentioning

confidence: 95%

Corruption and the effects of economic freedom

Pieroni

d’Agostino

2013

European Journal of Political Economy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The predictions that economic freedom is beneficial in reducing corruption have not been found to be universally robust in empirical studies. The present work reviews this relationship by using firms' data in a cross-country survey and argues that approaches using aggregated macro data have not been able to explain it appropriately. We model cross-country variations of the microfounded economic freedom-corruption relationship using multilevel models. Additionally, we analyze this relationship by disentangling the determinants for several components of economic freedom because not all areas affect corruption equally. The results show that the extent of the macro-effects on the measures of (micro)economic freedom for corruption, identified by the degree of economic development of a country, can explain why a lack of competition policies and government regulations may yield more corruption. Estimations for Africa and transition economy subsamples confirm our conjectures.JEL : H10; H11; H50; K20; O5

show abstract

“…10 Gorodnichenko and Peter [35] demonstrate that Ukrainian politicians have the same level of consumption expenditure and asset holdings as their private sector counterparts despite wage income that is around 40% lower. They attribute this difference to bribe taking.…”

Section: Assumptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political stability, corruption and trust in politicians

Schumacher

2013

Economic Modelling

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this article we develop a dynamic model where an endogenous evolution of trust impacts a politician's choice for bribe-taking and tax re-distribution. The politician obtains utility from net income that comes from his wage income, tax embezzlements and bribe-taking, and he also has incentives for tax re-distribution. The higher the tax embezzlements and the more bribes the politician takes the lower his citizens' trust and the less likely will he be re-elected. We support the evolution of trust with an econometric investigation.We analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions, and find that withholding taxes and taking bribes may be complements or substitutes for a politician, depending on the politician's incentives for tax re-distribution. Without these incentives, tax embezzlement and bribe taking are necessarily substitutes. With sufficiently strong incentives, we find re-distribution and bribe-taking may become complements. Complements implies that the politician, at least partly, increases bribe-taking because this allows him to increase re-distribution, which aids his additional motives for tax re-distribution.Based on comparative statics at steady state we also find that the higher the politician's wage the lower the bribe-taking and the higher the trust; stronger social capital leads to less bribe-taking and higher levels of trust; improvements in electoral accountability induce a decrease in bribing while trust increases.

show abstract

Public sector pay and corruption: Measuring bribery from micro data

Cited by 176 publications

References 34 publications

The politicians’ wage gap: insights from German members of parliament

The politicians’ wage gap: insights from German members of parliament

Corruption and the effects of economic freedom

Political stability, corruption and trust in politicians

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About