Public Sector Participation and Compliance across National and Global Transparency Regimes

Eccleston, Richard; Stubbs, Rhys

doi:10.1080/01900692.2015.1034322

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 34 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…1 Notable exceptions examining mock-compliance are Chey (2006Chey ( , 2014 and Walter (2006Walter ( , 2008, studying global banking standards and Eccleston and Stubbs (2016) and Woodward (2016), studying the international tax regime. 2 For studies on advanced economies see Gill and Law (1989), Bell and Hindmoor (2014), Culpepper (2015), and Young (2015).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…175–176). The few scholars studying mock‐compliance adopt Walter's first explanation (Eccleston & Stubbs 2016; Woodward 2016). Yet, two questions remain: If the durability of mock‐compliance is due to information asymmetries, why then are countries often able to sustain it as a strategy after detection?…”

Section: The Politics Of Sustained Mock‐compliancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 1 Notable exceptions examining mock‐compliance are Chey (2006, 2014) and Walter (2006, 2008), studying global banking standards and Eccleston and Stubbs (2016) and Woodward (2016), studying the international tax regime. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Tussle for space: The politics of mock‐compliance with global financial standards in developing countries

Dafe

Engebretsen

2021

Regulation & Governance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

As efforts to harmonize policies globally intensify, developing countries increasingly face pressures to adopt international standards. Yet, we know little about the circumstances under which developing countries manage to circumvent such pressures, or about their strategies to maintain policy space. We explore under which conditions developing countries are willing and able to sustain mock‐compliance, a situation where countries comply on paper but not in practice. Using country comparisons of Angola's, Nigeria's, Tanzania's, and Vietnam's engagement with the Basel banking standards, we show how three factors combine to produce sustained mock‐compliance: high costs of outright non‐compliance due to outward‐orientated banking sectors; high political costs of substantive compliance; and state control over profitable markets. Our article contributes to theory‐building in the literature on compliance and structural power as well as to broader debates about developing countries' policy autonomy in their engagement with global financial norms.

show abstract