Public-private collaborations in emergency logistics: A framework based on logistical and game-theoretical concepts

Abstract

Collaboration in emergency logistics can be beneficial for governmental actors when supply chains need to be set up immediately. In comparison to research on humanitarian-business partnerships, the body of literature on so-called Public-Private Emergency Collaborations (PPEC) remains scarce. Private companies are only rarely considered within research on emergency collaborations, although they could contribute to a more efficient supply of goods given their resources and existing communication networks. Based on this research gap, this paper develops a logistical and game-theoretical modeling framework for public-private emergency collaborations. We characterize both public and private actors' possible roles in emergency logistics based on literature research and real cases. Furthermore, we provide an overview on existing PPECs and the challenges they are confronted with. The concluding framework contains aspects from humanitarian logistics on the governmental side and from business continuity management (BCM) or corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the commercial side. To address the challenge of evaluating different objectives in a collaboration, we add a game-theoretical approach to highlight the incentive structure of both parties in such a collaboration. In this way, we contribute to the research field by quantitatively evaluating public-private collaboration in emergency logistics while considering the problem-specific challenge of the parties' different objectives.

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