Public Preferences for Bipartisanship in the Policymaking Process

Harbridge, Laurel; Malhotra, Neil; Harrison, Brian F.

doi:10.1111/lsq.12048

Cited by 84 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 32 publications

(33 reference statements)

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“…Asking Americans about their support for bipartisan compromise has limitations, however. While Americans claim support for bipartisan cooperation when asked directly, they may actually prefer partisan goal seeking (Harbridge, Malhotra, & Harrison, ). Thus, antideliberative attitudes should be measured in a less obvious way.…”

Section: Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Rousing the Partisan Combatant: Elite Incivility, Anger, and Antideliberative Attitudes

Gervais

2018

Political Psychology

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The claim that elite political incivility can rouse partisan, antideliberative attitudes has many adherents, but the empirical record demonstrating a relationship is surprisingly limited. Yet the extant research suggests that incivility can stimulate aversive feelings, of the sort that discrete and dimensional theories of emotion predict should induce a partisan, antideliberative mode of citizenship among those exposed. Leveraging two online experiments, I address the questions of whether elite incivility provokes anger, rather than enthusiasm and anxiety, and whether the affective reactions induced by incivility yield the changes in deliberative attitudes that theories of emotion predict. I find that elite incivility, when counterattitudinal, rouses anger, which in turn can provoke an active and combative form of partisan citizenship. Despite claims to the contrary, the link between proattitudinal incivility, anger, and antideliberative attitudes is less clear. The results provide insight into the dynamics of discourse in the digital age, when affective polarization is the norm and elites commonly employ uncivil rhetoric.

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Section: Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Rousing the Partisan Combatant: Elite Incivility, Anger, and Antideliberative Attitudes

Gervais

2018

Political Psychology

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“…). Moreover, when individuals are forced to interact with outgroup members, they often become anxious (e.g., Plant and Devine ), grow weary (e.g., Richeson and Trawalter ), and develop feelings of resentment or hostility (e.g., Enos , ). In light of research that citizen partisanship sometimes mimics the properties of social identities like race and gender (Green et al.…”

Section: Citizen Preference For Copartisan Contactmentioning

confidence: 99%

Preaching to the Choir: Americans Prefer Communicating to Copartisan Elected Officials

Broockman¹,

Ryan

2015

American J Political Sci

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Past work suggests that partisan attachments isolate citizens from encountering elite messages contrary to their points of view. Here, we present evidence that partisan attachments not only serve to filter the information citizens receive from political elites; they also work in the other direction, isolating politicians from encountering potentially contrary perspectives from citizens. In particular, we hypothesized that Americans prefer expressing their opinions to politicians who share their party identification and avoid contacting outpartisan politicians. Three studies-drawing on a mixture of observational, field experimental, and natural experimental approaches-support this hypothesis: Citizens prefer to "preach to the choir," contacting legislators of the same partisan stripe. In light of evidence that contact from citizens powerfully affects politicians' stances and priorities, these findings suggest a feedback loop that might aggravate political polarization and help explain how politicians of different parties could develop different perceptions of the same constituencies.

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“…They are unlikely to recognize or pay attention to nuanced movements in policy positions, but they can recognize a member's commitment to an ideological stance and they observe the benefits their district receives through their representative, particularly when interest groups and media communicate these actions to voters. Indeed, extant evidence suggests both that voters prefer uncompromising representatives and that excessive partisan loyalty can be electorally damaging (Carson et al, 2010;Harbridge, Malhotra and Harrison, 2014), especially in extreme constituencies (Harbridge and Malhotra, 2011). Thus, undermining ideological purity to move policy is a sub-optimal electoral strategy for representatives in extreme districts.…”

Section: A Theory Of Strategic Party Disloyaltymentioning

confidence: 99%

Ideology and strategic party disloyalty in the US house of representatives

Kirkland

Slapin

2017

Electoral Studies

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We offer a theory of strategic party disloyalty to explain roll call voting in the US House. Our theory suggests that ideologically extreme legislators become markedly less loyal to their party when it controls the majority. They stake out positions that align with the views of their extreme constituents when policy is likely to move in their direction. In contrast, ideological moderates become noticeably more loyal when they transition to the majority. Examining 35 years of ideal point estimates and measures of party unity on roll calls, we find clear evidence that member strategy, ideology, and legislative agenda setting interact to structure the frequency of defections. Further, we find evidence that defection and ideology interact to influence subsequent electoral outcomes.

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Public Preferences for Bipartisanship in the Policymaking Process

Cited by 84 publications

References 32 publications

Rousing the Partisan Combatant: Elite Incivility, Anger, and Antideliberative Attitudes

Rousing the Partisan Combatant: Elite Incivility, Anger, and Antideliberative Attitudes

Preaching to the Choir: Americans Prefer Communicating to Copartisan Elected Officials

Ideology and strategic party disloyalty in the US house of representatives

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