Public health and the ultra-processed food and drink products industry: corporate political activity of major transnationals in Latin America and the Caribbean

Abstract

ObjectiveTo identify examples of the ‘corporate political activity’ (CPA) of the industry producing and selling ultra-processed food and drink products (UPP) in Latin America and the Caribbean.DesignSearches were conducted on the national websites and social media accounts of large industry actors. Coding was deductive and based on a framework for classifying the CPA of the food industry.SettingFifteen countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.ParticipantsTwelve members of the International Food and Beverage Alliance (IFBA) and major trade associations and chambers of commerce in the region.ResultsDuring the current pilot study, more than 200 examples of CPA were found in Latin America and the Caribbean. The UPP industry lobbied governments during the development of national health policies. UPP companies tried to build alliances with health professionals, but also with communities where they operated and with policy makers. In addition, the UPP industry fought against regulation in court and proposed weaker alternatives to public health policies, such as self-regulation.ConclusionsFood systems in low- and middle-income countries, including in Latin America and the Caribbean, are increasingly penetrated by the UPP industry. These countries are at risk of being influenced by the CPA strategies described in the present study. There is a need to further identify, monitor and evaluate the impact of these CPA strategies on public health policies and public opinion in the region, in order to develop mechanisms to effectively prevent such interference.

Corporate political activity of the baby food industry: the example of Nestlé in the United States of America

“…The CPA strategies described here are similar to strategies previously documented as used by other industries [10,12,15,18,30,36,37] including the baby food industry [20], the alcohol and tobacco industries [6,8,22]. We have used an existing framework for classifying the CPA of the tobacco industry [8], adapted to the food industry [10] and an existing approach to data collection to identify and monitor the CPA of the food industry [10].…”

“…There is growing evidence of the global food industry's CPA strategies in: Asia [11]; the Western Pacific [12,13]; Europe [14]; Latin America and the Caribbean [15]. In Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Fiji, for example, companies in the food industry developed nutrition and physical activity programmes in schools, giving the impression that they were credible experts in these fields, while exposing children to their brands [12,15]. These programmes also served to shift the blame away from the healthiness of the industry's products and to the lack of physical activity in the non-communicable diseases epidemic [6,16].…”

“The architecture of the state was transformed in favour of the interests of companies”: corporate political activity of the food industry in Colombia

“…For our document analysis, we used a protocol developed by INFORMAS (International Network for Food and Obesity/non-communicable diseases Research, Monitoring and Action Support) for identifying the CPA of the food industry [16]. These methods and the framework used for our data analysis have been applied in different countries in the Pacific, Europe and Latin America [23,[25][26][27][28][29][30].…”

“…There is limited research and a lack of monitoring of the food industry CPA in Latin America [22], including Colombia. A pilot study in the region showed that in the country, food industry actors emphasised their prominent role in the economy in order to counter criticism; they tried to demonstrate that they were part of the solution in the prevention and control of NCD; and they built alliances with health organisations and communities [23].…”

The World Health Organization, Corporate Power, and the Prevention and Management of Conflicts of Interest in Nutrition Policy Comment on "Towards Preventing and Managing Conflict of Interest in Nutrition Policy? An Analysis of Submissions to a Consultation on a Draft WHO Tool"

“…12,41 Further, the fact that the tool notes that governments may consider following the decisionmaking process 'partially' is premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of how companies seek to influence health policy. Corporate political activity is highly varied, 42,43 plastic and constantly shifting. 12 This allows corporations to adapt their efforts to influence policy in response to changing institutional norms and public and political sentiment and, effectively, capitalise on all available political opportunities to build consensus within governments, legislatures, and publics against policy change.…”