Public employment and income redistribution: causal evidence for Brazilian municipalities

Mattos, Enlinson; França, Vitor Augusto Meira

doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9582-0

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Caselli and Michaels (n.d.) and Monteiro and Ferraz (2010) find that oil windfalls produce a positive incumbency advantage at the municipal level. Mattos and Franca (2011) find that local public employment fosters income concentration.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tying Your Enemy's Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil

2012

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. This paper uses a quasi-experimental strategy to disclose utterly political reasons behind the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in a federal state. We apply a regression discontinuity design in close elections to identify the effect of political alignment on federal transfers to municipal governments in Brazil. We find that municipalities where the mayor is affiliated with the coalition of the Brazilian President receive larger (discretionary) infrastructure transfers by about 40% in pre-election years. This effect is mainly driven by the fact that the federal government penalizes municipalities run by mayors from the opposition coalition who won by a narrow margin, thereby tying their hands for the next election.JEL Classification: C21, D72, H77

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tying Your Enemy's Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil

2012

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“…Ayrıca çalışmada kamu istihdamının üniter yapılı ülkelerde daha yüksek olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Mattos ve França (2011) 1991-2004 dönemi için Brezilya belediyelerinin verilerinden yararlanarak kamu istihdamı ile gelir dağılımı arasındaki ilişkiyi açıklamaya çalışmışlardır. Kamu istihdamının yeniden dağıtım mekanizması olarak kullanılabileceği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.…”

Section: Literatür İncelemesiunclassified

Politik Kutuplaşma ve Kamu Sektörü İstihdamı

Akdede

Keyifli

2021

Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi

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Devletler ekonomik ve sosyal faaliyetlerini yerine getirebilmek için personele ihtiyaç duymaktadırlar. Böylelikle devletin istihdam kanalıyla ekonomiyi etkilediği görülmektedir. Literatürde kamu sektörü istihdamı üzerine çok sayıda çalışma mevcuttur. Ancak, bildiğimiz kadarıyla önceki çalışmalar kamu sektörü üzerinde politik kutuplaşmanın etkisini ele almamıştır. Bu çalışma kamu sektörü istihdamı ile politik kutuplaşma arasındaki ilişkiyi ampirik olarak araştırmaktadır. Çalışmanın kapsamına gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan 22 ülke dâhildir ve çalışmada 2000-2018 dönemi için ilgili değişkenlerin yıllık verilerinin ortalaması kullanılmıştır. İstatistiksel analiz olarak yatay kesit analizi yapılmıştır. Politik kutuplaşma değişkeni Dünya Değerler Anketi (WVS) veri tabanından elde edilmiştir. Ekonometrik analiz sonucu elde edilen bulgular, politik kutuplaşmanın yüksek olduğu ülkelerde kamu sektörü istihdam düzeyinin oransal olarak daha yüksek olduğunu göstermektedir. Ek olarak, ampirik sonuçlarımıza göre dinsel çeşitliliğin yüksek olduğu toplumlarda kamu sektörü istihdamı da oransal olarak daha yüksektir. Çalışma bu bulguların bağlantılarını açıklamaktadır.

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“…specific social assistance programs that are often referred to as workfare. For example, some studies argue that governments use some forms of public employment as a tool for income redistribution, including evidence from the United States (Alesina et al [2000]) and other developed and developing countries (Mattos and França [2011]; Alesina et al [2001]; Clark and Milcent [2011]; among many others). 7 Thus, our model can provide an explanation for the demand for public employment as a redistributive tool.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare

Drenik

Pérez-Truglia

2018

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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We study the role of fairness concerns in the demand for redistribution through workfare. In the first part of the paper, we present new evidence from a survey. We show that individuals are more generous towards poor people whom they perceive to be diligent workers relative to poor people whom they perceive to be non-diligent, a social preference that we label sympathy for the diligent. This preference is much stronger than preferences regarding other characteristics of the poor, such as race, nationality, and disability. More important, we show that subjects with higher sympathy for the diligent have a stronger preference for workfare programs. In the second part of the paper, we incorporate our empirical findings into a model of income redistribution. We consider the case of a benevolent government with fairness concerns that prioritizes the wellbeing of individuals who exert the most effort. We characterize the optimal conditions under which the government introduces work requirements. Even if wasteful, work requirements can be optimal, because they allow for a better distinction between individuals who exert great effort and individuals who do not. However, if the government lacks commitment power, the availability of screening through work requirements leads to a lower equilibrium effort and, possibly, a Paretodominated allocation.

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Public employment and income redistribution: causal evidence for Brazilian municipalities

Abstract: Public employment, Income redistribution, Causal inference, H7, R5, H8,

Cited by 6 publications

References 15 publications

Tying Your Enemy's Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil

Tying Your Enemy's Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil

Politik Kutuplaşma ve Kamu Sektörü İstihdamı

Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare

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