Public Domain Treaty Compliance Verification in the Digital Age

Stubbs, C. W.; Drell, Sidney D.

doi:10.1109/mts.2013.2286432

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Such a task is hindered by the need to continuously verify the absence of undeclared nuclear reactors, materials, and weapons-relevant activities. The detection of undeclared nuclear reactors has historically been largely supported through national technical means, which involves the collection and analysis of materials, reactor emanations, and other information by individual states to verify compliance with international agreements (Stubbs and Drell, 2013).…”

Section: Current Safeguards Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Colloquium : Neutrino detectors as tools for nuclear security

et al. 2020

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For over 40 years, physicists have considered possible uses for neutrino detectors in nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, and fissile materials security. Neutrinos are an attractive fission signature because they readily pass through matter. The same property makes neutrinos challenging to detect in systems that would be practical for nuclear security applications. This colloquium presents a broad overview of several potential neutrino applications, including the near-field monitoring of known reactors, far-field monitoring of known or discovery of undeclared reactors, detection of reactor waste streams, and detection of nuclear explosions. We conclude that recent detector advances have made near-field monitoring feasible. Farther-field reactor detection and waste stream detection monitoring are possible in some cases with further research and development. Very long-range reactor monitoring and nuclear explosion detection do not appear feasible for the foreseeable future due to considerable physical and/or practical constraints.

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Section: Current Safeguards Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Colloquium : Neutrino detectors as tools for nuclear security

et al. 2020

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“…Technical advances for traditional monitoring can be complemented by nontraditional monitoring, which could include what Rotblatt called societal verification 1 and by what Stubbs and Drell called public technical means. 2 In the former, citizens of a treaty-bound country see it as their obligation to report publicly or to international bodies any potential violation of their nation's treaty obligations. The latter involves non-government analysis of open-source information.…”

Section: Marvin Adamsmentioning

confidence: 99%