Public Discourse and Constitutional Change: A Comparison of Vietnam and Indonesia

Abstract

in this Special Issue is that public discourse is shaping the reform agenda. Some commentators argue that public discourse is animating a transition from a Soviet-influenced authoritarian constitution to a more liberal incarnation that legally defines the interface between state and society. Others are less certain about the impact of liberal constitutional discourse, and argue instead that Confucianism and East Asian illiberalism are equally important discursive influences. Although differing in their normative emphasis, these accounts share a common view that public commentary is propelling the party-state toward some kind of constitutionally limited government. This transformation involves a shift from a constitution that coordinates state agencies, announces state ideology, and controls and elicits cooperation from subordinates, to one that also establishes legal limits to party and state power. Despite unprecedented public discussion during the lead-up to the 2013 Constitution, commentators agree that reforms have been modest. Public calls for amendments that would have made the party and state legally accountable to the constitution were rejected. For example, the party leadership emphatically opposed constitutional oversight of the party, the separation of powers, a constitutional review council, legally enforceable guarantees of civil rights, and private land ownership. Nevertheless, many commentators remain optimistic that eventually the constitution will legally constrain party and state power. This faith in the capacity of public discourse to fundamentally change the conceptual underpinnings of the constitution raises fundamental questions. How does public discourse change deeply held constitutional preferences in authoritarian political spaces? What kinds of public discourse are the most persuasive in shaping law-making? This article draws on neo-Habermasian scholarship 1 to analyze the interaction between public discourse and constitutional change. It then contrasts constitutional discourse in Vietnam with public discourse that fundamentally changed the Indonesian Constitution after the fall of President Soeharto in 1998. It argues that key

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